| 2441 |
permissions (e.g. allow_env PATH if symlink.target="/"), it triggered |
permissions (e.g. allow_env PATH if symlink.target="/"), it triggered |
| 2442 |
NULL pointer dereference. |
NULL pointer dereference. |
| 2443 |
|
|
| 2444 |
Fix 2010/07/21 |
Fix 2010/07/29 |
| 2445 |
|
|
| 2446 |
|
@ Change keyword syntax. |
| 2447 |
|
|
| 2448 |
|
I removed "allow_" prefix from directives. New directives for files are |
| 2449 |
|
prefixed with "file ". For example, "allow_read" changed to "file read", |
| 2450 |
|
"allow_ioctl" changed to "file ioctl". New directive for "allow_network" |
| 2451 |
|
is "network". New directive for "allow_env" is "misc env". New directive |
| 2452 |
|
for "allow_signal" is "ipc signal". New directive for "allow_capability" |
| 2453 |
|
is "capability". These directives correspond with keywords used by |
| 2454 |
|
profile's CONFIG lines. |
| 2455 |
|
|
| 2456 |
|
I removed "deny_rewrite" and "allow_rewrite" directives and introduced |
| 2457 |
|
"file append" directive. Thus, permission for open(O_WRONLY | O_APPEND) |
| 2458 |
|
changed from "allow_write" + "allow_rewrite" to "file append". |
| 2459 |
|
|
| 2460 |
|
I removed "SYS_MOUNT", "SYS_UMOUNT", "SYS_CHROOT", "SYS_KILL", |
| 2461 |
|
"SYS_LINK", "SYS_SYMLINK", "SYS_RENAME", "SYS_UNLINK", "SYS_CHMOD", |
| 2462 |
|
"SYS_CHOWN", "SYS_IOCTL", "SYS_PIVOT_ROOT" keywords from capabilities |
| 2463 |
|
because these permissions can be checked by other directives (e.g. |
| 2464 |
|
"file mount", "ipc signal"). |
| 2465 |
|
|
| 2466 |
|
I also removed "conceal_mount" keyword from capabilities because this |
| 2467 |
|
check requires hooks in filesystem part while almost all hooks for |
| 2468 |
|
filesystem part have moved to LSM by Linux 2.6.34. |
| 2469 |
|
|
| 2470 |
|
@ Distinguish send() and recv() operations for UDP and IP protocols. |
| 2471 |
|
|
| 2472 |
|
Until now, it was impossible for UDP and IP protocols to allow either |
| 2473 |
|
only sending or only receiving because permissions were aggregated with |
| 2474 |
|
"connect" keyword. I broke "connect" keyword into "send" and "recv" |
| 2475 |
|
keywords so that you can keep access control for send() operation enabled |
| 2476 |
|
when you have to turn access control for recv() operation off due to |
| 2477 |
|
application breakage by filtering incoming datagram. |
| 2478 |
|
|
| 2479 |
@ Wait for next connection/datagram if current connection/datagram was |
@ Wait for next connection/datagram if current connection/datagram was |
| 2480 |
discarded. |
discarded. |
| 2481 |
|
|
| 2482 |
I was misunderstanding the discussion of post accept()/recvmsg() hook. |
Regarding "network TCP accept", "network UDP recv", "network RAW recv" |
| 2483 |
The kernel is allowed to wait for next connection/datagram unless |
keywords, I modified to wait for next connection/datagram if current |
| 2484 |
MSG_DONTWAIT or O_NONBLOCK is set. The kernel is allowed to return |
connection/datagram was discarded. LSM hooks for these keywords are |
| 2485 |
-EAGAIN if MSG_DONTWAIT or O_NONBLOCK is set. |
currently missing because this behavior may break applications. |
| 2486 |
The change I made on 2009/05/08 was wrong. |
If you found applications broken by this behavior, you can set |
| 2487 |
|
CONFIG::network::inet_tcp_accept and/or CONFIG::network::inet_udp_recv |
| 2488 |
|
and/or CONFIG::network::inet_raw_recv to mode=disabled in order to |
| 2489 |
|
disable filtering for incoming connection/datagram. |
| 2490 |
|
|
| 2491 |
|
@ Allow specifying multiple permissions in a line. |
| 2492 |
|
|
| 2493 |
|
Until now, only "allow_read/write" can be specified for combination of |
| 2494 |
|
"allow_read" + "allow_write". Now, you can combine other permissions as |
| 2495 |
|
long as type of parameters for these permissions is same. For example, |
| 2496 |
|
"file read/write/append/execute/unlink/truncate /tmp/file" is correct |
| 2497 |
|
but "file read/write/create /tmp/file" is wrong because "file create" |
| 2498 |
|
requires create mode whereas "file read" and "file write" do not. |
| 2499 |
|
|
| 2500 |
|
@ Allow wildcard for execute permission and domainname. |
| 2501 |
|
|
| 2502 |
|
Until now, to execute programs with temporary names, "aggregator" is |
| 2503 |
|
needed. To simplify code, I modified to accept wildcards for execute |
| 2504 |
|
permission and domainname. Now, you can directly specify |
| 2505 |
|
"file execute /tmp/logrotate.\?\?\?\?\?\?" and use |
| 2506 |
|
"/tmp/logrotate.\?\?\?\?\?\?" within domainnames. |
| 2507 |
|
|
| 2508 |
|
@ Change pathname for non-rename()able filesystems. |
| 2509 |
|
|
| 2510 |
|
LSM version of TOMOYO wants to use /proc/self/ rather than /proc/$PID/ if |
| 2511 |
|
$PID matches current thread's process ID in order to prevent current |
| 2512 |
|
thread from accessing other process's information unless needed. |
| 2513 |
|
But since procfs can be mounted on various locations (e.g. /proc/ /proc2/ |
| 2514 |
|
/p/ /tmp/foo/100/p/ ), LSM version of TOMOYO cannot tell that whether the |
| 2515 |
|
numeric part in the string returned by __d_path() represents process ID |
| 2516 |
|
or not. |
| 2517 |
|
|
| 2518 |
|
Therefore, to be able to convert from $PID to self no matter where procfs |
| 2519 |
|
is mounted, I changed pathname representations for filesystems which do |
| 2520 |
|
not support rename() operation (e.g. proc, sysfs, securityfs). |
| 2521 |
|
|
| 2522 |
|
Now, "/proc/self/mounts" changed to "proc:/self/mounts" and |
| 2523 |
|
"/sys/kernel/security/" changed to "sys:/kernel/security/" and |
| 2524 |
|
"/dev/pts/0" changed to "devpts:/0". |
| 2525 |
|
|
| 2526 |
|
@ Add a new keyword "any" for domain transition control. |
| 2527 |
|
|
| 2528 |
|
To be able to make it easier to apply execute_handler on each domain, |
| 2529 |
|
I added "any" keyword to domain transition control keywords. Now, |
| 2530 |
|
"initialize_domain /usr/sbin/sshd" changed to |
| 2531 |
|
"initialize_domain /usr/sbin/sshd from any" and |
| 2532 |
|
"keep_domain <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash" changed to |
| 2533 |
|
"keep_domain any from <kernel> /usr/sbin/sshd /bin/bash". |
| 2534 |
|
|
| 2535 |
|
"keep_domain /path/to/execute_handler from any" will allow you to apply |
| 2536 |
|
execute_handler for any domains without creating domains for |
| 2537 |
|
execute_handler. |
| 2538 |
|
|
| 2539 |
|
@ Change buffering mode for reading policy. |
| 2540 |
|
|
| 2541 |
|
To be able to read() very very long lines correctly, I changed the way |
| 2542 |
|
TOMOYO buffers policy for reading. |
| 2543 |
|
|
| 2544 |
|
@ Introduce "acl_group" keyword. |
| 2545 |
|
|
| 2546 |
|
Until now, it was possible to specify only "allow_read" and "allow_env" |
| 2547 |
|
keywords in the exception policy. |
| 2548 |
|
|
| 2549 |
|
Since some operations like "file read/write/append /dev/null" and |
| 2550 |
|
"network UDP send/recv @DNS_SERVER 53" are very common and should be |
| 2551 |
|
permitted to all domains, I introduced "acl_group" keyword for giving |
| 2552 |
|
such permissions. |
| 2553 |
|
|
| 2554 |
|
For example, specify "acl_group 0 file read/write/append /dev/null" in |
| 2555 |
|
the exception policy and specify "use_group 0" from the domains in the |
| 2556 |
|
domain policy. |
| 2557 |
|
|
| 2558 |
|
"ignore_global_allow_read" and "ignore_global_allow_env" keywords were |
| 2559 |
|
removed from domain policy and "use_group" keyword was added. |
| 2560 |
|
|
| 2561 |
|
@ Allow controlling generation of access granted logs for per an entry |
| 2562 |
|
basis. |
| 2563 |
|
|
| 2564 |
|
I added per-entry flag which controls generation of grant logs because |
| 2565 |
|
Xen and KVM issues ioctl requests so frequently. For example, |
| 2566 |
|
|
| 2567 |
|
file ioctl /dev/null 0x5401 ; set audit=no |
| 2568 |
|
|
| 2569 |
|
will suppress /proc/ccs/grant_log even if profile says grant_log=yes . |
| 2570 |
|
|
| 2571 |
|
file ioctl /dev/null 0x5401 ; set audit=yes |
| 2572 |
|
|
| 2573 |
|
will generate /proc/ccs/grant_log even if profile says grant_log=no . |
| 2574 |
|
|
| 2575 |
|
file ioctl /dev/null 0x5401 |
| 2576 |
|
|
| 2577 |
|
will generate /proc/ccs/grant_log only if profile says grant_log=yes . |
| 2578 |
|
|
| 2579 |
|
This flag is intended for frequently accessed resources like |
| 2580 |
|
|
| 2581 |
|
file read /var/www/html/\{\*\}/\*.html ; set audit=no |
| 2582 |
|
|
| 2583 |
|
. |
| 2584 |
|
|
| 2585 |
|
@ Optimize for object's size. |
| 2586 |
|
|
| 2587 |
|
I merged similar code in order to reduce object's filesize. |