1 |
Notes for TOMOYO Linux project |
Notes for TOMOYO Linux project |
2 |
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3 |
This is a handy Mandatory Access Control patch for Linux kernels. |
This is a handy Mandatory Access Control patch for Linux kernels. |
4 |
This patch is released under the GPL. |
This patch is released under the GPLv2. |
5 |
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6 |
Project URL: http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/ |
Project URL: http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/ |
7 |
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769 |
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770 |
@ Allow reuse of memory allocated for domain policy. |
@ Allow reuse of memory allocated for domain policy. |
771 |
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|
772 |
As with domain policy, unlike other policies, didn't have |
Regarding domain policy, unlike other policies, didn't have |
773 |
"is_deleted" flag and new memory were allocated |
"is_deleted" flag and new memory were allocated |
774 |
if the deleted entries are given again. |
if the deleted entries are given again. |
775 |
But to allow administrators switch domain policy periodically, |
But to allow administrators switch domain policy periodically, |
854 |
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|
855 |
I moved the location of calling CheckCapabilityACL() |
I moved the location of calling CheckCapabilityACL() |
856 |
and CheckMountPermission() from sys_mount() to do_mount(). |
and CheckMountPermission() from sys_mount() to do_mount(). |
857 |
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858 |
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Fix 2007/03/07 |
859 |
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860 |
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@ Use 'unsigned int' for sscanf(). |
861 |
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|
862 |
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I compiled SYAORAN fs on x86_64 environment and found |
863 |
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the compiler showing warning messages about size of data types. |
864 |
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Since size of data types may mismatch for sscanf(), |
865 |
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I replaced some types with 'unsigned int'. |
866 |
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|
867 |
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Version 1.4 2007/04/01 x86_64 support release. |
868 |
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|
869 |
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Fix 2007/04/18 |
870 |
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|
871 |
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@ Change argv[0] checking rule. |
872 |
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|
873 |
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I was comparing the basename of symbolic link's pathname and argv[0]. |
874 |
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Since execute permission check and domain transition are done |
875 |
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based on realpath while argv[0] check is done based on the symlink's |
876 |
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pathname and argv[0], this specification will allow attackers behave |
877 |
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as /bin/cat in the domain of /bin/ls if "/bin/ls and /bin/cat are |
878 |
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links to /sbin/busybox" and "the attacker is permitted to create |
879 |
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a symlink named ~/cat that points to /bin/ls" and "the attacker is |
880 |
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permitted to run /bin/ls". |
881 |
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So, I changed to compare the basename of realpath and argv[0]. |
882 |
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Also, I moved the location to compare before processing |
883 |
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"aggregator" directive so that |
884 |
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"aggregator /tmp/logrotate.\?\?\?\?\?\? /tmp/logrotate.tmp" |
885 |
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won't cause the mismatch of the basename of realpath and argv[0]. |
886 |
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|
887 |
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If /bin/ls is a symlink to /sbin/busybox, then |
888 |
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creating a symlink named ~/cat that points to /bin/ls and |
889 |
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executing ~/cat won't work as expected because permission check and |
890 |
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domain transition are done using /sbin/busybox (realpath of /bin/ls) |
891 |
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and will be rejected since the administrator won't grant |
892 |
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"1 /sbin/busybox". |
893 |
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|
894 |
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Fix 2007/05/07 |
895 |
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|
896 |
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@ Support pathname subtraction. |
897 |
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|
898 |
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There was no way to exclude specific pathnames when granting |
899 |
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permissions using wildcards. |
900 |
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There would be a need to exclude specific files and directories. |
901 |
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I introduced "\-" as subtraction operator. |
902 |
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|
903 |
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"A\-B" means "A" other than "B". |
904 |
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"A\-B\-C" means "A" other than "B" and "C". |
905 |
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"A\-B\-C\-D" means "A" other than "B" and "C" and "D". |
906 |
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|
907 |
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"A", "B", "C", "D" may contain wildcards. |
908 |
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|
909 |
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An example usage is "/home/\*/\*\-.ssh/\*", which means |
910 |
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"/home/\*/\*/\*" other than "/home/\*/.ssh/\*". |
911 |
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|
912 |
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"A" should contain wildcards because subtraction from constants |
913 |
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(e.g. "/usr\-usr/" or "/usr\-home/") is meaningless. |
914 |
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915 |
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Don't try "A\-B\+C" because "\+" is not addition operator. |
916 |
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|
917 |
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Fix 2007/05/24 |
918 |
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|
919 |
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@ Fix autobind hook. |
920 |
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|
921 |
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The location to call SAKURA_MayAutobind() in net/ipv4/udp.c |
922 |
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and net/ipv6/udp.c were wrong. |
923 |
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|
924 |
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Fix 2007/06/03 |
925 |
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|
926 |
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@ Add a space in MakeMountOptions(). |
927 |
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|
928 |
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I forgot to add a space after "atime" and "noatime". |
929 |
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|
930 |
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Version 1.4.1 2007/06/05 Minor update release. |
931 |
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932 |
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Fix 2007/07/04 |
933 |
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934 |
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@ Fix ReadAddressGroupPolicy() bug. |
935 |
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|
936 |
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ReadAddressGroupPolicy() fails if both "path_group" and "address_group" |
937 |
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are used because I forgot to set "head->read_var1 = NULL". |
938 |
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|
939 |
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Fix 2007/07/10 |
940 |
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|
941 |
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@ Add compat_sys_stime() hook. |
942 |
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|
943 |
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Some of 64bit kernels support compat_sys_stime() |
944 |
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but permission check was missing. |
945 |
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|
946 |
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Version 1.4.2 2007/07/13 Bug fix release. |
947 |
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948 |
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Fix 2007/08/06 |
949 |
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950 |
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@ Remove mount-flags manipulation. |
951 |
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|
952 |
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Until now, administrator is permitted to turn on/off specific mount |
953 |
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options regardless of mount options passed to kernel. |
954 |
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I removed this feature because "exact option matching" sounds better than |
955 |
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"automatic option enabler/disabler". |
956 |
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|
957 |
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@ Remove /proc/ccs/info/mapping . |
958 |
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|
959 |
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I removed /proc/ccs/info/mapping because nobody seems to use this |
960 |
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feature. |
961 |
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|
962 |
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@ Call external policy loader automatically. |
963 |
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|
964 |
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Until now, users had to add init=/.init parameter to load policy |
965 |
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before /sbin/init starts. |
966 |
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I inserted call_usermodehelper() to call external policy loader when |
967 |
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execve("/sbin/init") is requested and external policy loader exists. |
968 |
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|
969 |
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This change will remove init=/.init parameter from most environment, |
970 |
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although call_usermodehelper() can't handle interactive operations. |
971 |
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|
972 |
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@ Move external policy loader from /.init to /sbin/ccs-init . |
973 |
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|
974 |
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Installing programs in / directory is not good for packaging. |
975 |
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|
976 |
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Fix 2007/08/13 |
977 |
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|
978 |
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@ Update external policy loader. |
979 |
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|
980 |
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It turned out that /sbin/ccs-init invoked via call_usermodehelper() |
981 |
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can handle interactive operations by opening /dev/console . |
982 |
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Now, there is no difference between init=/sbin/ccs-init and |
983 |
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call_usermodehelper("/sbin/ccs-init"), and users no longer need to |
984 |
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add init=/sbin/ccs-init parameter to load policy before /sbin/init |
985 |
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starts. |
986 |
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|
987 |
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Fix 2007/08/14 |
988 |
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|
989 |
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@ Update recvmsg() hooks. |
990 |
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|
991 |
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Until now, it was impossible to apply network access control for |
992 |
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incoming UDP and RAW packets if they are brought to userland using |
993 |
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read() or recvmsg() with NULL address because address buffer is NULL. |
994 |
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I moved hooks from sock_recvmsg() to skb_recv_datagram() so that |
995 |
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network access control for incoming UDP and RAW packets always work. |
996 |
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|
997 |
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Fix 2007/08/16 |
998 |
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|
999 |
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@ Return appropriate error code for CheckMountPermission(). |
1000 |
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|
1001 |
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I was returning -EPERM if something is wrong with CheckMountPermission(). |
1002 |
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But SELinux determines whether selinuxfs is supported by kernel |
1003 |
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based on whether error code is -ENODEV or not. |
1004 |
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So I stopped returning -EPERM unconditionally. |
1005 |
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|
1006 |
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Fix 2007/08/17 |
1007 |
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|
1008 |
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@ Remove initializer directive. |
1009 |
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|
1010 |
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Use "initialize_domain" instrad of "initializer". |
1011 |
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|
1012 |
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Fix 2007/08/21 |
1013 |
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|
1014 |
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@ Fix "allow_argv0 ... if if ..." bug. |
1015 |
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|
1016 |
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It was impossible to use a word "if" to the second argument of |
1017 |
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allow_argv0 if condition part is used. |
1018 |
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|
1019 |
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Fix 2007/08/24 |
1020 |
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|
1021 |
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@ Move /proc/ccs/\*/\* to /proc/ccs/\* . |
1022 |
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|
1023 |
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Some pathnames for /proc/ccs/ interface were changed. |
1024 |
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|
1025 |
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Fix 2007/09/05 |
1026 |
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|
1027 |
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@ Drop MSG_PEEK'ed message before skb_free_datagram(). |
1028 |
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|
1029 |
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I need to remove head message from unwanted source |
1030 |
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from socket's receive queue so that the caller can pick up |
1031 |
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next message from wanted source with MSG_PEEK flags. |
1032 |
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|
1033 |
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Version 1.5.0 2007/09/20 Usability enhancement release. |
1034 |
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|
1035 |
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Fix 2007/09/27 |
1036 |
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|
1037 |
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@ Avoid eating memory after quota exceeded. |
1038 |
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|
1039 |
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Although ACL entries in a domain won't be added if the domain's quota |
1040 |
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has exceeded, SaveName() in AddFileACL() is called anyway. |
1041 |
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This caused unneeded memory consumption. |
1042 |
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|
1043 |
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Now, quota checking is done before getting domain_acl_lock lock. |
1044 |
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This may exceed quota by one or two entries, but that won't matter. |
1045 |
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|
1046 |
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Fix 2007/10/16 |
1047 |
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|
1048 |
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@ Add environment variable check. |
1049 |
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|
1050 |
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There are environment variables that may cause dangerous behavior |
1051 |
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like LD_\* . |
1052 |
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So I introduced 'allow_env' directive that allows specified |
1053 |
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environment variable inherited to next domain. |
1054 |
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Unlike other permissions, this check is done at execve() time |
1055 |
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using next domain's ACL information. |
1056 |
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|
1057 |
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To manage commonly inherited environments like PATH , |
1058 |
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you can use 'allow_env' directive in exception policy |
1059 |
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to globally grant specified environment variable. |
1060 |
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|
1061 |
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Fix 2007/11/05 |
1062 |
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|
1063 |
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@ Replace semaphore with mutex. |
1064 |
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|
1065 |
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I replaced semaphore with mutex. |
1066 |
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|
1067 |
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@ Add missing down() in AddReservedEntry(). |
1068 |
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|
1069 |
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Mutex debugging capability told me that I had forgotten to call down() |
1070 |
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since TOMOYO version 1.3.2 . |
1071 |
|
This function is not called by learning mode, |
1072 |
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so the semaphore's counter will not overflow for normal usage. |
1073 |
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|
1074 |
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Fix 2005/11/27 |
1075 |
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|
1076 |
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@ Fix ReadTable() truncation bug. |
1077 |
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|
1078 |
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"snprintf(str, size, format, ...) >= size" means truncated. |
1079 |
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But I was checking for "snprintf(str, size, format, ...) > size". |
1080 |
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As a result, some entries might be dumped without '\n'. |
1081 |
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|
1082 |
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@ Purge direct "->prev"/"->next" manipulation. |
1083 |
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|
1084 |
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All list manipulations use "struct list_head" or "struct list1_head". |
1085 |
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"struct list1_head" doesn't have "->prev" member to save memory usage. |
1086 |
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|
1087 |
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Fix 2007/11/29 |
1088 |
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|
1089 |
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@ Add missing semaphore in GetEXE(). |
1090 |
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|
1091 |
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mm->mmap_sem was missing. |
1092 |
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|
1093 |
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Fix 2007/12/17 |
1094 |
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|
1095 |
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@ Remove unused EXPORT_SYMBOL(). |
1096 |
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|
1097 |
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Mark some functions static. |
1098 |
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|
1099 |
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Fix 2007/12/18 |
1100 |
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|
1101 |
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@ Fix AddMountACL() rejection bug. |
1102 |
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|
1103 |
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To my surprise, "mount --bind source dest" accepts |
1104 |
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not only "both source and dest are directory" |
1105 |
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but also "both source and dest are non-directory". |
1106 |
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I was rejecting if dest is not a directory in AddMountACL(). |
1107 |
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|
1108 |
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@ Change log format. |
1109 |
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|
1110 |
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Profile number and mode is added in audit logs. |
1111 |
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|
1112 |
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Fix 2008/01/03 |
1113 |
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|
1114 |
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@ Change directive for file's read/write/execute permission. |
1115 |
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|
1116 |
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Directives for file's read/write/execute permissions were |
1117 |
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4/2/1 respectively. But for easier understanding, they are now |
1118 |
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replaced by read/write/execute (e.g. "allow_read" instead of "4"). |
1119 |
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But for easier inputting, 4/2/1 are still accepted instead of |
1120 |
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allow_read/allow_write/allow_execute respectively. |
1121 |
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|
1122 |
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@ Change internal data structure. |
1123 |
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|
1124 |
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Since I don't have more than 16 types of file permissions, |
1125 |
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I combined them using bit-fields. |
1126 |
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|
1127 |
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Each entry had a field for conditional permission support. |
1128 |
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But since this field is unlikely used, I separated the field from |
1129 |
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common part. |
1130 |
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|
1131 |
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These changes will reduce memory used by policy. |
1132 |
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|
1133 |
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Fix 2008/01/15 |
1134 |
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|
1135 |
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@ Add ptrace() hook. |
1136 |
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|
1137 |
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To prevent attackers from controlling important processes using |
1138 |
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ptrace(), I added a hook for ptrace(). |
1139 |
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Most programs (except strace(1) and gdb(1)) won't use ptrace(2). |
1140 |
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|
1141 |
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@ Fix sleep condition check in CheckSocketRecvDatagramPermission(). |
1142 |
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|
1143 |
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It seems that correct method to use is in_atomic() |
1144 |
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rather than in_interrupt() because in_atomic() returns nonzero |
1145 |
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whenever scheduling is not allowed. |
1146 |
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|
1147 |
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Fix 2008/02/05 |
1148 |
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|
1149 |
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@ Use find_task_by_vpid() instead of find_task_by_pid(). |
1150 |
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|
1151 |
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Kernel 2.6.24 introduced PID namespace. |
1152 |
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To search PID given from userland, the kernel needs to use |
1153 |
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find_task_by_vpid() instead of find_task_by_pid(). |
1154 |
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|
1155 |
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Fix 2008/02/14 |
1156 |
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|
1157 |
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@ Add execve() parameter checking. |
1158 |
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|
1159 |
|
Until now, it was impossible to check argv[] and envp[] parameters |
1160 |
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passed to execve(). |
1161 |
|
I expanded conditional permission syntax so that |
1162 |
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{ argc, envc, argv[] , envp[] } parameters can be checked if needed. |
1163 |
|
This will allow administrator permit execution of /bin/sh only when |
1164 |
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/bin/sh is invoked in the form of "/bin/sh -c" and environment variable |
1165 |
|
HOME is set by specifying |
1166 |
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|
1167 |
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allow_execute /bin/sh if exec.argv[1]="-c" exec.envp["HOME"]!=NULL |
1168 |
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|
1169 |
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in the policy. |
1170 |
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This extension will make exploit codes difficult to start /bin/sh because |
1171 |
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they unlikely set up environment variables and unlikely specify "-c" |
1172 |
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option when invoking /bin/sh , whereas proper functions likely set up |
1173 |
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environment variables and likely specify "-c" option. |
1174 |
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|
1175 |
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Fix 2008/02/18 |
1176 |
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|
1177 |
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@ Add process state checking. |
1178 |
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|
1179 |
|
Until now, it was impossible to change ACL without executing program. |
1180 |
|
I added three variables for performing stateful checking within a domain. |
1181 |
|
You can set current process's state like: |
1182 |
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|
1183 |
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allow_network TCP accept @TRUSTED_HOSTS 1024-65535 ; set task.state[0]=1 |
1184 |
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allow_network TCP accept @UNTRUSTED_HOSTS 1024-65535 ; set task.state[0]=0 |
1185 |
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|
1186 |
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and you can use the state like |
1187 |
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|
1188 |
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allow_read /path/to/important/file if task.state[0]=1 |
1189 |
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|
1190 |
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in the policy. |
1191 |
|
The state changes when the request was granted by the MAC's policy, |
1192 |
|
so please be careful with situations where the state has changed |
1193 |
|
successfully but the request was not processed because of other reasons |
1194 |
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(e.g. out of memory). |
1195 |
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|
1196 |
|
Fix 2008/02/26 |
1197 |
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|
1198 |
|
@ Support /proc/ccs/ access by non-root user. |
1199 |
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|
1200 |
|
Until now, only root user can access /proc/ccs/ interface. |
1201 |
|
But to permit /proc/ccs/ access by non-root user so that it won't require |
1202 |
|
ssh login by root user when administrating from remote host, |
1203 |
|
I made "(current->uid == 0 && current->euid == 0)" requirement optional. |
1204 |
|
If this requirement is disabled, only "conventional DAC permission |
1205 |
|
checks" and "/proc/ccs/manager checks" are used. |
1206 |
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|
1207 |
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Fix 2008/02/29 |
1208 |
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|
1209 |
|
@ Add sleep_on_violation feature. |
1210 |
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|
1211 |
|
Some exploit codes (e.g. trans2open for Samba) continue running |
1212 |
|
until it achieves the purpose of the exploit code (e.g. invoke /bin/sh). |
1213 |
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|
1214 |
|
If such code is injected due to buffer overflow but the kernel |
1215 |
|
rejects the request, it triggers infinite "Permission denied" loop. |
1216 |
|
As a result, the CPU usage becomes 100% and gives bad effects to |
1217 |
|
the rest of processes. |
1218 |
|
This is a side effect of rejecting the request from the exploit code |
1219 |
|
which wouldn't happen if the request from the exploit code was granted. |
1220 |
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|
1221 |
|
To avoid such CPU consumption, I added a penalty that forcibly |
1222 |
|
sleeps for specified period when a request is rejected. |
1223 |
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|
1224 |
|
This penalty doesn't work if the exploit code does nothing but |
1225 |
|
continue running, but I think most exploit code's purpose is |
1226 |
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to start some program rather than to slow down the target system. |
1227 |
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|
1228 |
|
@ Add alt_exec feature. |
1229 |
|
|
1230 |
|
Since TOMOYO Linux's approach is "know all essential requests in advance |
1231 |
|
and create policy that permits only them", you can regard anomalous |
1232 |
|
requests as attacks (if you want to do so). |
1233 |
|
|
1234 |
|
Common MAC implementations merely reject requests that violate policy. |
1235 |
|
But I added a special handler for execve() to TOMOYO Linux. |
1236 |
|
|
1237 |
|
This handler is triggered when a process requested to execute a program |
1238 |
|
but the request was rejected by the policy. |
1239 |
|
This handler executes a program specified by the administrator |
1240 |
|
instead of a program requested by the process. |
1241 |
|
|
1242 |
|
Most attackers attempt to execute /bin/sh to start something malicious. |
1243 |
|
Attackers execute an exploit code using buffer overflow vulnerability |
1244 |
|
to steal control of a process. But this handler can get back control |
1245 |
|
if an exploit code requests execve() that is not permitted by policy. |
1246 |
|
|
1247 |
|
By default, this handler does nothing (i.e. merely reject execve() |
1248 |
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request). You can specify any program to start what you want to do. |
1249 |
|
|
1250 |
|
You can redirect attackers to somewhere else (e.g. honey pot). |
1251 |
|
This makes it possible to act your Linux box as an on-demand honey pot |
1252 |
|
while keeping regular services for your usage. |
1253 |
|
|
1254 |
|
You can collect information of the attacker (e.g. IP address) and |
1255 |
|
update firewall configuration. |
1256 |
|
|
1257 |
|
You can silently terminate a process who requested execve() |
1258 |
|
that is not permitted by policy. |
1259 |
|
|
1260 |
|
Fix 2008/03/03 |
1261 |
|
|
1262 |
|
@ Add "force_alt_exec" keyword. |
1263 |
|
|
1264 |
|
To be able to fully utilize "alt_exec" feature, |
1265 |
|
I added "force_alt_exec" keyword so that |
1266 |
|
all execute requests are replaced by the execute request of a program |
1267 |
|
specified by alt_exec feature. |
1268 |
|
|
1269 |
|
If this keyword is specified for a domain, the domain no longer |
1270 |
|
executes any programs regardless of the mode of file access control |
1271 |
|
(i.e. the domain won't execute even if MAC_FOR_FILE=0 ). |
1272 |
|
Instead, the domain executes the program specified by alt_exec feature |
1273 |
|
and the program specified by alt_exec feature validates the execute |
1274 |
|
request and executes it if it is appropriate to execute. |
1275 |
|
|
1276 |
|
If you can tolerate that there is no chance to return an error code |
1277 |
|
to the caller to tell the execute request was rejected, |
1278 |
|
this is more flexible approach than in-kernel execve() parameter |
1279 |
|
checking because we can do argv[] and envp[] checking easily. |
1280 |
|
|
1281 |
|
Fix 2008/03/04 |
1282 |
|
|
1283 |
|
@ Use string for access control mode. |
1284 |
|
|
1285 |
|
An integer expression for access control mode sometimes confuses |
1286 |
|
administrators because profile number is also an integer expression. |
1287 |
|
To avoid confusion between profile number and access control mode, |
1288 |
|
I introduced a string expression for access control mode. |
1289 |
|
|
1290 |
|
Modes which take an integer between 0 and 3. |
1291 |
|
|
1292 |
|
0 -> disabled |
1293 |
|
1 -> learning |
1294 |
|
2 -> permissive |
1295 |
|
3 -> enforcing |
1296 |
|
|
1297 |
|
Modes which take 0 or 1. |
1298 |
|
|
1299 |
|
0 -> disabled |
1300 |
|
1 -> enabled |
1301 |
|
|
1302 |
|
Fix 2008/03/10 |
1303 |
|
|
1304 |
|
@ Rename "force_alt_exec" keyword to "execute_handler". |
1305 |
|
|
1306 |
|
To be able to use different programs for validating execve() parameters, |
1307 |
|
I moved the location to specify the program's pathname from profile |
1308 |
|
to domain policy. |
1309 |
|
|
1310 |
|
The "execute_handler" keyword takes one pathname which is |
1311 |
|
invoked whenever execve() request is issued. Thus, any "allow_execute" |
1312 |
|
keywords in a domain with "execute_handler" are ignored. |
1313 |
|
This keyword is designed for validating expected/desirable execve() |
1314 |
|
requests in userspace, although there is no way to tell the caller |
1315 |
|
that the execve() request was rejected. |
1316 |
|
|
1317 |
|
@ Rename "alt_exec" keyword to "denied_execute_handler". |
1318 |
|
|
1319 |
|
The "denied_execute_handler" keyword takes one pathname which is |
1320 |
|
invoked only when execve() request was rejected. In other words, |
1321 |
|
this program is invoked only when the following conditions are met. |
1322 |
|
|
1323 |
|
(1) None of "allow_execute" keywords in the domain matched. |
1324 |
|
(2) The execve() request was rejected in enforcing mode. |
1325 |
|
(3) "execute_handler" keyword is not used by the domain. |
1326 |
|
|
1327 |
|
This keyword is designed for handling unexpected/undesirable execve() |
1328 |
|
requests, to redirect the process issuing such requests to somewhere. |
1329 |
|
|
1330 |
|
Fix 2008/03/18 |
1331 |
|
|
1332 |
|
@ Fix wrong/redundant locks in pre-vfs functions. |
1333 |
|
|
1334 |
|
lock_kernel()/unlock_kernel() in pre_vfs_rename() were redundant for |
1335 |
|
2.6 kernels. |
1336 |
|
|
1337 |
|
Locking order in pre_vfs_link() and pre_vfs_unlink() for 2.4 kernels |
1338 |
|
after 2.4.33 were different from before 2.4.32 . |
1339 |
|
|
1340 |
|
Fix 2008/03/28 |
1341 |
|
|
1342 |
|
@ Disable execute handler loop. |
1343 |
|
|
1344 |
|
To be able to use "execute_handler" in a "keep_domain" domain, |
1345 |
|
ignore "execute_handler" and "denied_execute_handler" keywords |
1346 |
|
if the current process is executing programs specified by |
1347 |
|
"execute_handler" or "denied_execute_handler" keyword. |
1348 |
|
|
1349 |
|
This exception is needed to avoid infinite execute handler loop. |
1350 |
|
If a domain has both "keep_domain" and "execute_handler", |
1351 |
|
any execute request by that domain is handled by an execute handler, |
1352 |
|
and the execute handler attempts to process original execute request. |
1353 |
|
But the original execute request is handled by the same execute handler |
1354 |
|
unless the execute handler ignores "execute_handler". |
1355 |
|
|
1356 |
|
@ Update coding style. |
1357 |
|
|
1358 |
|
I rewrote the code to pass scripts/checkpatch.pl as much as possible. |
1359 |
|
Function names were changed to use only lower letters. |
1360 |
|
|
1361 |
|
Version 1.6.0 2008/04/01 Feature enhancement release. |
1362 |
|
|
1363 |
|
Fix 2008/04/14 |
1364 |
|
|
1365 |
|
@ Fix "Compilation failures" and "Initialization ordering bugs" |
1366 |
|
with kernels before 2.4.30/2.6.11 . |
1367 |
|
|
1368 |
|
2.6 kernels before 2.6.9 didn't have include/linux/hardirq.h , |
1369 |
|
resulting compilation error at #include <linux/hardirq.h> . |
1370 |
|
I added #elif condition. |
1371 |
|
|
1372 |
|
CentOS 4.6's 2.6.9 kernel calls do_execve() before initialization of |
1373 |
|
ccs_alloc(), resulting NULL pointer dereference. |
1374 |
|
I changed __initcall to core_initcall. |
1375 |
|
|
1376 |
|
CentOS 4.6's 2.6.9 kernel backported kzalloc() from 2.6.14 , |
1377 |
|
resulting compilation error at kzalloc(). |
1378 |
|
I modified prototype of kzalloc(). |
1379 |
|
|
1380 |
|
Fix 2008/04/20 |
1381 |
|
|
1382 |
|
@ Fix "Compilation failures" with kernels before 2.4.30/2.6.11 . |
1383 |
|
|
1384 |
|
Turbolinux 10 Server's 2.6.8 kernel backported kzalloc() as an inlined |
1385 |
|
function, resulting compilation error at kzalloc(). |
1386 |
|
I converted kzalloc() from an inlined function into a macro. |
1387 |
|
|
1388 |
|
Fix 2008/04/21 |
1389 |
|
|
1390 |
|
@ Add workaround for gcc 3.2.2's inline bug. |
1391 |
|
|
1392 |
|
RedHat Linux 9's gcc 3.2.2 generated a bad code |
1393 |
|
if ((var_of_u8 & 0x000000BF) & 0x80000000) { } |
1394 |
|
where the expected code is |
1395 |
|
if ((var_of_u8 & 0xBF) & 0x80) { } |
1396 |
|
when embedding ccs_acl_type2() into print_entry(), |
1397 |
|
resulting runtime BUG(). |
1398 |
|
I added the expected code explicitly as a workaround. |
1399 |
|
|
1400 |
|
Fix 2008/05/06 |
1401 |
|
|
1402 |
|
@ Add memory quota. |
1403 |
|
|
1404 |
|
1.5.x returns -ENOMEM when FindNextDomain() failed to create a new |
1405 |
|
domain, but I forgot to return -ENOMEM when find_next_domain() failed to |
1406 |
|
create a new domain. |
1407 |
|
|
1408 |
|
A domain is automatically created by find_next_domain() only if |
1409 |
|
the domain for the requested program doesn't exist. |
1410 |
|
This behavior is for the administrator's convenience. |
1411 |
|
The administrator needn't to know how many domains are needed for running |
1412 |
|
the whole programs in the system beforehand when developing the policy. |
1413 |
|
But the administrator does not want the kernel to reject execution of the |
1414 |
|
requested program when developing the policy. |
1415 |
|
|
1416 |
|
So, I think it is better to grant execution of programs even if |
1417 |
|
find_next_domain() failed to create a new domain than reject execution. |
1418 |
|
Thus, I decided not to return -ENOMEM when find_next_domain() failed to |
1419 |
|
create a new domain. This exception breaks the domain transition rules, |
1420 |
|
so I print "transition_failed" warning in /proc/ccs/domain_policy |
1421 |
|
when this exception happened. |
1422 |
|
|
1423 |
|
Also, to prevent the system from being halted by unexpectedly allocating |
1424 |
|
all kernel memory for the policy, I added memory quota. |
1425 |
|
This quota is configurable via /proc/ccs/meminfo like |
1426 |
|
|
1427 |
|
echo Shared: 1048576 > /proc/ccs/meminfo |
1428 |
|
echo Private: 1048576 > /proc/ccs/meminfo |
1429 |
|
|
1430 |
|
Version 1.6.1 2008/05/10 Bug fix release. |
1431 |
|
|
1432 |
|
Fix 2008/06/04 |
1433 |
|
|
1434 |
|
@ Check open mode of /proc/ccs/ interface. |
1435 |
|
|
1436 |
|
It turned out that I can avoid allocating memory for reading if |
1437 |
|
FMODE_READ is not set and memory for writing if FMODE_WRITE is not set. |
1438 |
|
|
1439 |
|
@ Wait for completion of /sbin/ccs-init . |
1440 |
|
|
1441 |
|
Since 2.4 kernel's call_usermodehelper() can't wait for termination of |
1442 |
|
the executed program, I was using the close() request of |
1443 |
|
/proc/ccs/meminfo to indicate that loading policy has finished. |
1444 |
|
But since /proc/ccs/meminfo could be accessed for setting memory quota |
1445 |
|
by /etc/ccs/ccs-post-init , I stopped using the close() request. |
1446 |
|
The policy loader no longer need to access /proc/ccs/meminfo to notify |
1447 |
|
the kernel that loading policy has finished. |
1448 |
|
|
1449 |
|
Fix 2008/06/05 |
1450 |
|
|
1451 |
|
@ Fix realpath for pipes and sockets. |
1452 |
|
|
1453 |
|
Kernel 2.6.22 and later use different method for calculating d_path(). |
1454 |
|
Since fs/realpath.c didn't notice the change, the realpath of pipes |
1455 |
|
appeared as "pipe:" rather than "pipe:[\$]" when they are opened via |
1456 |
|
/proc/PID/fd/ directory. |
1457 |
|
|
1458 |
|
@ Add process's information into /proc/ccs/query . |
1459 |
|
|
1460 |
|
While /proc/ccs/grant_log and /proc/ccs/reject_log contain process's |
1461 |
|
information, /proc/ccs/query doesn't contain it. |
1462 |
|
To be able to utilize ccs-queryd and ccs-notifyd more, I added it into |
1463 |
|
/proc/ccs/query . |
1464 |
|
|
1465 |
|
Fix 2008/06/10 |
1466 |
|
|
1467 |
|
@ Allow using patterns for globally readable files. |
1468 |
|
|
1469 |
|
To allow users specify locale specific files to globally readable files, |
1470 |
|
I relaxed checking in update_globally_readable_entry(). |
1471 |
|
|
1472 |
|
Fix 2008/06/11 |
1473 |
|
|
1474 |
|
@ Remove ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE parameter. |
1475 |
|
|
1476 |
|
Since unexpected requests caused by doing software updates can happen |
1477 |
|
in all profiles, users likely have to write ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE=enabled |
1478 |
|
to all profiles. And it makes meaningless to allow users to selectively |
1479 |
|
enable specific profile's ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE parameter. |
1480 |
|
So, I removed ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE parameter. |
1481 |
|
Now, the system behaves as if ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE=enabled is specified. |
1482 |
|
The behavior of "delayed enforcing" mode is defined in the following |
1483 |
|
order. |
1484 |
|
|
1485 |
|
(1) The requests are rejected immediately if nobody is opening |
1486 |
|
/proc/ccs/query interface. |
1487 |
|
(2) The requests will be rejected in 10 seconds if somebody other than |
1488 |
|
ccs-queryd (such as less(1)) is opening /proc/ccs/query interface, |
1489 |
|
for such process doesn't write dummy decisions. |
1490 |
|
|
1491 |
|
Fix 2008/06/22 |
1492 |
|
|
1493 |
|
@ Pass escaped pathname to audit_execute_handler_log(). |
1494 |
|
|
1495 |
|
I was passing unescaped pathname to audit_execute_handler_log() |
1496 |
|
which causes /proc/ccs/grant_log contain whitespace characters |
1497 |
|
if execute handler's pathname contains whitespace characters. |
1498 |
|
|
1499 |
|
Fix 2008/06/25 |
1500 |
|
|
1501 |
|
@ Return 0 when ccs_may_umount() succeeds. |
1502 |
|
|
1503 |
|
I forgot to clear error value in ccs_may_umount() when the requested |
1504 |
|
directory didn't match "deny_unmount" keyword. As a result, any umount() |
1505 |
|
request with RESTRICT_UNMOUNT=enforcing returned -EPERM error. |
1506 |
|
|
1507 |
|
Version 1.6.2 2008/06/25 Usability enhancement release. |
1508 |
|
|
1509 |
|
Fix 2008/07/01 |
1510 |
|
|
1511 |
|
@ Fix "Compilation failure" with 2.4.20 kernel. |
1512 |
|
|
1513 |
|
RedHat Linux 9's 2.4.20 kernel backported O(1) scheduler patch, |
1514 |
|
resulting compilation error at ccs_load_policy(). |
1515 |
|
I added defined(TASK_DEAD) check. |