1569 |
a process which violated policy, administrator can update policy while |
a process which violated policy, administrator can update policy while |
1570 |
the process is sleeping. This "try again" response allows administrator |
the process is sleeping. This "try again" response allows administrator |
1571 |
to restart policy checks from the beginning after updating policy. |
to restart policy checks from the beginning after updating policy. |
1572 |
|
|
1573 |
|
Fix 2008/09/11 |
1574 |
|
|
1575 |
|
@ Remember whether the process is allowed to write to /proc/ccs/ interface. |
1576 |
|
|
1577 |
|
Since programs for manipulating policy (e.g. ccs-queryd ) are installed |
1578 |
|
in the form of RPM/DEB packages, these programs lose the original |
1579 |
|
pathnames when they are updated by the package manager. The package |
1580 |
|
manager renames these programs before deleting these programs so that |
1581 |
|
the package manager can rollback the operation. |
1582 |
|
This causes a problem when the programs are listed into /proc/ccs/manager |
1583 |
|
using pathnames, as the programs will no longer be allowed to write to |
1584 |
|
/proc/ccs/ interface while the process of old version of the program is |
1585 |
|
alive. |
1586 |
|
|
1587 |
|
To solve this problem, I modified to remember the fact that the process |
1588 |
|
is once allowed to write to /proc/ccs/ interface until the process |
1589 |
|
attempts to execute a different program. |
1590 |
|
This change makes it impossible to revoke permission to write to |
1591 |
|
/proc/ccs/ interface without killing the process, but it will be better |
1592 |
|
than nonfunctioning ccs-queryd program. |
1593 |
|
|
1594 |
|
Fix 2008/09/19 |
1595 |
|
|
1596 |
|
@ Allow selecting a domain by PID. |
1597 |
|
|
1598 |
|
Sometimes we want to know what ACLs are given to specific PID, but |
1599 |
|
finding a domainname for that PID from /proc/ccs/.process_status and |
1600 |
|
reading ACLs from /proc/ccs/domain_policy by the domainname is very slow. |
1601 |
|
Thus, I modified /proc/ccs/domain_policy to allow selecting a domain by |
1602 |
|
PID. For example, to read domain ACL of current process from bash, |
1603 |
|
run as follows. |
1604 |
|
|
1605 |
|
# exec 100<>/proc/ccs/domain_policy |
1606 |
|
# echo select pid=$$ >&100 |
1607 |
|
# while read -u 100; do echo $REPLY; done |
1608 |
|
|
1609 |
|
If a domain is once selected by PID, reading /proc/ccs/domain_policy will |
1610 |
|
print only that domain if that PID exists or print nothing otherwise. |
1611 |
|
|
1612 |
|
@ Disallow concurrent /proc/ccs/ access using the same file descriptor. |
1613 |
|
|
1614 |
|
Until now, one process can read() from /proc/ccs/ while other process |
1615 |
|
that shares the file descriptor can write() to /proc/ccs/ . |
1616 |
|
But to implement "Allow selecting a domain by PID" feature, I disabled |
1617 |
|
concurrent read()/write() because the feature need to modify read buffer |
1618 |
|
while writing. |
1619 |
|
|
1620 |
|
Fix 2008/10/01 |
1621 |
|
|
1622 |
|
@ Add retry counter into /proc/ccs/query . |
1623 |
|
|
1624 |
|
To be able to handle some of queries from /proc/ccs/query without user's |
1625 |
|
interaction, I added retry counter for avoiding infinite loop caused by |
1626 |
|
"try again" response. |
1627 |
|
|
1628 |
|
Fix 2008/10/07 |
1629 |
|
|
1630 |
|
@ Don't transit to new domain until do_execve() succeeds. |
1631 |
|
|
1632 |
|
Until now, a process's domain was updated to new domain which the process |
1633 |
|
will belongs to before do_execve() succeeds so that the kernel can do |
1634 |
|
permission checks for interpreters and environment variables based on |
1635 |
|
new domain. But this caused a subtle problem when other process sends |
1636 |
|
signals to the process, for the process returns to old domain if |
1637 |
|
do_execve() failed. |
1638 |
|
|
1639 |
|
So, I modified to pass new domain to functions so that I can avoid |
1640 |
|
modifying a process's domain before do_execve() succeeds. |
1641 |
|
|
1642 |
|
@ Use old task state for audit logs. |
1643 |
|
|
1644 |
|
Until now, audit logs were generated using the task state after |
1645 |
|
processing "; set task.state" part. But to generate accurate logs, |
1646 |
|
I modified to save the task state before processing "; set task.state" |
1647 |
|
part and use the saved state for audit logs. |
1648 |
|
|
1649 |
|
@ Use a structure for passing parameters. |
1650 |
|
|
1651 |
|
As the number of parameters is increasing, I modified to use a structure |
1652 |
|
for passing parameters. |
1653 |
|
|
1654 |
|
@ Always allow updating task state for signal operations. |
1655 |
|
|
1656 |
|
ccs_check_signal_acl() was skipping permission checks if signal is NULL |
1657 |
|
or sent to self or sent to same domain. To make it possible to update |
1658 |
|
task state when current process is sending NULL signal or to self or |
1659 |
|
to same domain, I modified to check ACL anyway. The result of access |
1660 |
|
control will not change, but this modification will generate granted logs |
1661 |
|
which were not generated until now. |