1 |
Notes for TOMOYO Linux project |
Notes for TOMOYO Linux project |
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This is a handy Mandatory Access Control patch for Linux kernels. |
This is a handy Mandatory Access Control patch for Linux kernels. |
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This patch is released under the GPL. |
This patch is released under the GPLv2. |
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6 |
Project URL: http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/ |
Project URL: http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/ |
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769 |
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770 |
@ Allow reuse of memory allocated for domain policy. |
@ Allow reuse of memory allocated for domain policy. |
771 |
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|
772 |
As with domain policy, unlike other policies, didn't have |
Regarding domain policy, unlike other policies, didn't have |
773 |
"is_deleted" flag and new memory were allocated |
"is_deleted" flag and new memory were allocated |
774 |
if the deleted entries are given again. |
if the deleted entries are given again. |
775 |
But to allow administrators switch domain policy periodically, |
But to allow administrators switch domain policy periodically, |
933 |
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934 |
@ Fix ReadAddressGroupPolicy() bug. |
@ Fix ReadAddressGroupPolicy() bug. |
935 |
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|
936 |
ReadAddressGroupPolicy() fails if both "path_group" and "address_group" are used |
ReadAddressGroupPolicy() fails if both "path_group" and "address_group" |
937 |
because I forgot to set "head->read_var1 = NULL". |
are used because I forgot to set "head->read_var1 = NULL". |
938 |
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939 |
Fix 2007/07/10 |
Fix 2007/07/10 |
940 |
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949 |
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950 |
@ Remove mount-flags manipulation. |
@ Remove mount-flags manipulation. |
951 |
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952 |
Until now, administrator is permitted to turn on/off specific mount options |
Until now, administrator is permitted to turn on/off specific mount |
953 |
regardless of mount options passed to kernel. |
options regardless of mount options passed to kernel. |
954 |
I removed this feature because "exact option matching" sounds better than |
I removed this feature because "exact option matching" sounds better than |
955 |
"automatic option enabler/disabler". |
"automatic option enabler/disabler". |
956 |
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957 |
@ Remove /proc/ccs/info/mapping . |
@ Remove /proc/ccs/info/mapping . |
958 |
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959 |
I removed /proc/ccs/info/mapping because nobody seems to use this feature. |
I removed /proc/ccs/info/mapping because nobody seems to use this |
960 |
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feature. |
961 |
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|
962 |
@ Call external policy loader automatically. |
@ Call external policy loader automatically. |
963 |
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|
981 |
can handle interactive operations by opening /dev/console . |
can handle interactive operations by opening /dev/console . |
982 |
Now, there is no difference between init=/sbin/ccs-init and |
Now, there is no difference between init=/sbin/ccs-init and |
983 |
call_usermodehelper("/sbin/ccs-init"), and users no longer need to |
call_usermodehelper("/sbin/ccs-init"), and users no longer need to |
984 |
add init=/sbin/ccs-init parameter to load policy before /sbin/init starts. |
add init=/sbin/ccs-init parameter to load policy before /sbin/init |
985 |
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starts. |
986 |
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|
987 |
Fix 2007/08/14 |
Fix 2007/08/14 |
988 |
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1083 |
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|
1084 |
All list manipulations use "struct list_head" or "struct list1_head". |
All list manipulations use "struct list_head" or "struct list1_head". |
1085 |
"struct list1_head" doesn't have "->prev" member to save memory usage. |
"struct list1_head" doesn't have "->prev" member to save memory usage. |
1086 |
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1087 |
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Fix 2007/11/29 |
1088 |
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1089 |
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@ Add missing semaphore in GetEXE(). |
1090 |
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|
1091 |
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mm->mmap_sem was missing. |
1092 |
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1093 |
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Fix 2007/12/17 |
1094 |
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1095 |
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@ Remove unused EXPORT_SYMBOL(). |
1096 |
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1097 |
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Mark some functions static. |
1098 |
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1099 |
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Fix 2007/12/18 |
1100 |
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1101 |
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@ Fix AddMountACL() rejection bug. |
1102 |
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1103 |
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To my surprise, "mount --bind source dest" accepts |
1104 |
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not only "both source and dest are directory" |
1105 |
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but also "both source and dest are non-directory". |
1106 |
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I was rejecting if dest is not a directory in AddMountACL(). |
1107 |
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1108 |
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@ Change log format. |
1109 |
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1110 |
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Profile number and mode is added in audit logs. |
1111 |
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1112 |
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Fix 2008/01/03 |
1113 |
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1114 |
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@ Change directive for file's read/write/execute permission. |
1115 |
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1116 |
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Directives for file's read/write/execute permissions were |
1117 |
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4/2/1 respectively. But for easier understanding, they are now |
1118 |
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replaced by read/write/execute (e.g. "allow_read" instead of "4"). |
1119 |
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But for easier inputting, 4/2/1 are still accepted instead of |
1120 |
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allow_read/allow_write/allow_execute respectively. |
1121 |
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1122 |
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@ Change internal data structure. |
1123 |
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1124 |
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Since I don't have more than 16 types of file permissions, |
1125 |
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I combined them using bit-fields. |
1126 |
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1127 |
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Each entry had a field for conditional permission support. |
1128 |
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But since this field is unlikely used, I separated the field from |
1129 |
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common part. |
1130 |
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1131 |
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These changes will reduce memory used by policy. |
1132 |
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1133 |
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Fix 2008/01/15 |
1134 |
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1135 |
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@ Add ptrace() hook. |
1136 |
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1137 |
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To prevent attackers from controlling important processes using |
1138 |
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ptrace(), I added a hook for ptrace(). |
1139 |
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Most programs (except strace(1) and gdb(1)) won't use ptrace(2). |
1140 |
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1141 |
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@ Fix sleep condition check in CheckSocketRecvDatagramPermission(). |
1142 |
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1143 |
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It seems that correct method to use is in_atomic() |
1144 |
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rather than in_interrupt() because in_atomic() returns nonzero |
1145 |
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whenever scheduling is not allowed. |
1146 |
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1147 |
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Fix 2008/02/05 |
1148 |
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1149 |
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@ Use find_task_by_vpid() instead of find_task_by_pid(). |
1150 |
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1151 |
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Kernel 2.6.24 introduced PID namespace. |
1152 |
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To search PID given from userland, the kernel needs to use |
1153 |
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find_task_by_vpid() instead of find_task_by_pid(). |
1154 |
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1155 |
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Fix 2008/02/14 |
1156 |
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1157 |
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@ Add execve() parameter checking. |
1158 |
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|
1159 |
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Until now, it was impossible to check argv[] and envp[] parameters |
1160 |
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passed to execve(). |
1161 |
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I expanded conditional permission syntax so that |
1162 |
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{ argc, envc, argv[] , envp[] } parameters can be checked if needed. |
1163 |
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This will allow administrator permit execution of /bin/sh only when |
1164 |
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/bin/sh is invoked in the form of "/bin/sh -c" and environment variable |
1165 |
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HOME is set by specifying |
1166 |
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1167 |
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allow_execute /bin/sh if exec.argv[1]="-c" exec.envp["HOME"]!=NULL |
1168 |
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1169 |
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in the policy. |
1170 |
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This extension will make exploit codes difficult to start /bin/sh because |
1171 |
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they unlikely set up environment variables and unlikely specify "-c" |
1172 |
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option when invoking /bin/sh , whereas proper functions likely set up |
1173 |
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environment variables and likely specify "-c" option. |
1174 |
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1175 |
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Fix 2008/02/18 |
1176 |
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1177 |
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@ Add process state checking. |
1178 |
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|
1179 |
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Until now, it was impossible to change ACL without executing program. |
1180 |
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I added three variables for performing stateful checking within a domain. |
1181 |
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You can set current process's state like: |
1182 |
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1183 |
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allow_network TCP accept @TRUSTED_HOSTS 1024-65535 ; set task.state[0]=1 |
1184 |
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allow_network TCP accept @UNTRUSTED_HOSTS 1024-65535 ; set task.state[0]=0 |
1185 |
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1186 |
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and you can use the state like |
1187 |
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1188 |
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allow_read /path/to/important/file if task.state[0]=1 |
1189 |
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1190 |
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in the policy. |
1191 |
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The state changes when the request was granted by the MAC's policy, |
1192 |
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so please be careful with situations where the state has changed |
1193 |
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successfully but the request was not processed because of other reasons |
1194 |
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(e.g. out of memory). |
1195 |
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1196 |
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Fix 2008/02/26 |
1197 |
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1198 |
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@ Support /proc/ccs/ access by non-root user. |
1199 |
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1200 |
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Until now, only root user can access /proc/ccs/ interface. |
1201 |
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But to permit /proc/ccs/ access by non-root user so that it won't require |
1202 |
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ssh login by root user when administrating from remote host, |
1203 |
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I made "(current->uid == 0 && current->euid == 0)" requirement optional. |
1204 |
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If this requirement is disabled, only "conventional DAC permission |
1205 |
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checks" and "/proc/ccs/manager checks" are used. |
1206 |
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1207 |
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Fix 2008/02/29 |
1208 |
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1209 |
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@ Add sleep_on_violation feature. |
1210 |
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1211 |
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Some exploit codes (e.g. trans2open for Samba) continue running |
1212 |
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until it achieves the purpose of the exploit code (e.g. invoke /bin/sh). |
1213 |
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|
1214 |
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If such code is injected due to buffer overflow but the kernel |
1215 |
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rejects the request, it triggers infinite "Permission denied" loop. |
1216 |
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As a result, the CPU usage becomes 100% and gives bad effects to |
1217 |
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the rest of processes. |
1218 |
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This is a side effect of rejecting the request from the exploit code |
1219 |
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which wouldn't happen if the request from the exploit code was granted. |
1220 |
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1221 |
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To avoid such CPU consumption, I added a penalty that forcibly |
1222 |
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sleeps for specified period when a request is rejected. |
1223 |
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|
1224 |
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This penalty doesn't work if the exploit code does nothing but |
1225 |
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continue running, but I think most exploit code's purpose is |
1226 |
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to start some program rather than to slow down the target system. |
1227 |
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1228 |
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@ Add alt_exec feature. |
1229 |
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1230 |
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Since TOMOYO Linux's approach is "know all essential requests in advance |
1231 |
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and create policy that permits only them", you can regard anomalous |
1232 |
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requests as attacks (if you want to do so). |
1233 |
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1234 |
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Common MAC implementations merely reject requests that violate policy. |
1235 |
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But I added a special handler for execve() to TOMOYO Linux. |
1236 |
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|
1237 |
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This handler is triggered when a process requested to execute a program |
1238 |
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but the request was rejected by the policy. |
1239 |
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This handler executes a program specified by the administrator |
1240 |
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instead of a program requested by the process. |
1241 |
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|
1242 |
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Most attackers attempt to execute /bin/sh to start something malicious. |
1243 |
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Attackers execute an exploit code using buffer overflow vulnerability |
1244 |
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to steal control of a process. But this handler can get back control |
1245 |
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if an exploit code requests execve() that is not permitted by policy. |
1246 |
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1247 |
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By default, this handler does nothing (i.e. merely reject execve() |
1248 |
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request). You can specify any program to start what you want to do. |
1249 |
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|
1250 |
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You can redirect attackers to somewhere else (e.g. honey pot). |
1251 |
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This makes it possible to act your Linux box as an on-demand honey pot |
1252 |
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while keeping regular services for your usage. |
1253 |
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|
1254 |
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You can collect information of the attacker (e.g. IP address) and |
1255 |
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update firewall configuration. |
1256 |
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|
1257 |
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You can silently terminate a process who requested execve() |
1258 |
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that is not permitted by policy. |
1259 |
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1260 |
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Fix 2008/03/03 |
1261 |
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1262 |
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@ Add "force_alt_exec" keyword. |
1263 |
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|
1264 |
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To be able to fully utilize "alt_exec" feature, |
1265 |
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I added "force_alt_exec" keyword so that |
1266 |
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all execute requests are replaced by the execute request of a program |
1267 |
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specified by alt_exec feature. |
1268 |
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|
1269 |
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If this keyword is specified for a domain, the domain no longer |
1270 |
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executes any programs regardless of the mode of file access control |
1271 |
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(i.e. the domain won't execute even if MAC_FOR_FILE=0 ). |
1272 |
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Instead, the domain executes the program specified by alt_exec feature |
1273 |
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and the program specified by alt_exec feature validates the execute |
1274 |
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request and executes it if it is appropriate to execute. |
1275 |
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|
1276 |
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If you can tolerate that there is no chance to return an error code |
1277 |
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to the caller to tell the execute request was rejected, |
1278 |
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this is more flexible approach than in-kernel execve() parameter |
1279 |
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checking because we can do argv[] and envp[] checking easily. |
1280 |
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|
1281 |
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Fix 2008/03/04 |
1282 |
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|
1283 |
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@ Use string for access control mode. |
1284 |
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|
1285 |
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An integer expression for access control mode sometimes confuses |
1286 |
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administrators because profile number is also an integer expression. |
1287 |
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To avoid confusion between profile number and access control mode, |
1288 |
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I introduced a string expression for access control mode. |
1289 |
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1290 |
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Modes which take an integer between 0 and 3. |
1291 |
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1292 |
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0 -> disabled |
1293 |
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1 -> learning |
1294 |
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2 -> permissive |
1295 |
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3 -> enforcing |
1296 |
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1297 |
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Modes which take 0 or 1. |
1298 |
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1299 |
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0 -> disabled |
1300 |
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1 -> enabled |
1301 |
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1302 |
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Fix 2008/03/10 |
1303 |
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1304 |
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@ Rename "force_alt_exec" keyword to "execute_handler". |
1305 |
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|
1306 |
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To be able to use different programs for validating execve() parameters, |
1307 |
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I moved the location to specify the program's pathname from profile |
1308 |
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to domain policy. |
1309 |
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|
1310 |
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The "execute_handler" keyword takes one pathname which is |
1311 |
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invoked whenever execve() request is issued. Thus, any "allow_execute" |
1312 |
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keywords in a domain with "execute_handler" are ignored. |
1313 |
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This keyword is designed for validating expected/desirable execve() |
1314 |
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requests in userspace, although there is no way to tell the caller |
1315 |
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that the execve() request was rejected. |
1316 |
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|
1317 |
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@ Rename "alt_exec" keyword to "denied_execute_handler". |
1318 |
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|
1319 |
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The "denied_execute_handler" keyword takes one pathname which is |
1320 |
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invoked only when execve() request was rejected. In other words, |
1321 |
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this program is invoked only when the following conditions are met. |
1322 |
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|
1323 |
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(1) None of "allow_execute" keywords in the domain matched. |
1324 |
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(2) The execve() request was rejected in enforcing mode. |
1325 |
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(3) "execute_handler" keyword is not used by the domain. |
1326 |
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|
1327 |
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This keyword is designed for handling unexpected/undesirable execve() |
1328 |
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requests, to redirect the process issuing such requests to somewhere. |
1329 |
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|
1330 |
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Fix 2008/03/18 |
1331 |
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|
1332 |
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@ Fix wrong/redundant locks in pre-vfs functions. |
1333 |
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|
1334 |
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lock_kernel()/unlock_kernel() in pre_vfs_rename() were redundant for |
1335 |
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2.6 kernels. |
1336 |
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|
1337 |
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Locking order in pre_vfs_link() and pre_vfs_unlink() for 2.4 kernels |
1338 |
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after 2.4.33 were different from before 2.4.32 . |
1339 |
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|
1340 |
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Fix 2008/03/28 |
1341 |
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|
1342 |
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@ Disable execute handler loop. |
1343 |
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|
1344 |
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To be able to use "execute_handler" in a "keep_domain" domain, |
1345 |
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ignore "execute_handler" and "denied_execute_handler" keywords |
1346 |
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if the current process is executing programs specified by |
1347 |
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"execute_handler" or "denied_execute_handler" keyword. |
1348 |
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|
1349 |
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This exception is needed to avoid infinite execute handler loop. |
1350 |
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If a domain has both "keep_domain" and "execute_handler", |
1351 |
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any execute request by that domain is handled by an execute handler, |
1352 |
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and the execute handler attempts to process original execute request. |
1353 |
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But the original execute request is handled by the same execute handler |
1354 |
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unless the execute handler ignores "execute_handler". |
1355 |
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|
1356 |
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@ Update coding style. |
1357 |
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|
1358 |
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I rewrote the code to pass scripts/checkpatch.pl as much as possible. |
1359 |
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Function names were changed to use only lower letters. |
1360 |
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|
1361 |
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Version 1.6.0 2008/04/01 Feature enhancement release. |
1362 |
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|
1363 |
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Fix 2008/04/14 |
1364 |
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|
1365 |
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@ Fix "Compilation failures" and "Initialization ordering bugs" |
1366 |
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with kernels before 2.4.30/2.6.11 . |
1367 |
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|
1368 |
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2.6 kernels before 2.6.9 didn't have include/linux/hardirq.h , |
1369 |
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resulting compilation error at #include <linux/hardirq.h> . |
1370 |
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I added #elif condition. |
1371 |
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|
1372 |
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CentOS 4.6's 2.6.9 kernel calls do_execve() before initialization of |
1373 |
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ccs_alloc(), resulting NULL pointer dereference. |
1374 |
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I changed __initcall to core_initcall. |
1375 |
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|
1376 |
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CentOS 4.6's 2.6.9 kernel backported kzalloc() from 2.6.14 , |
1377 |
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resulting compilation error at kzalloc(). |
1378 |
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I modified prototype of kzalloc(). |
1379 |
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|
1380 |
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Fix 2008/04/20 |
1381 |
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|
1382 |
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@ Fix "Compilation failures" with kernels before 2.4.30/2.6.11 . |
1383 |
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|
1384 |
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Turbolinux 10 Server's 2.6.8 kernel backported kzalloc() as an inlined |
1385 |
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function, resulting compilation error at kzalloc(). |
1386 |
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I converted kzalloc() from an inlined function into a macro. |
1387 |
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|
1388 |
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Fix 2008/04/21 |
1389 |
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|
1390 |
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@ Add workaround for gcc 3.2.2's inline bug. |
1391 |
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|
1392 |
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RedHat Linux 9's gcc 3.2.2 generated a bad code |
1393 |
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if ((var_of_u8 & 0x000000BF) & 0x80000000) { } |
1394 |
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where the expected code is |
1395 |
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if ((var_of_u8 & 0xBF) & 0x80) { } |
1396 |
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when embedding ccs_acl_type2() into print_entry(), |
1397 |
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resulting runtime BUG(). |
1398 |
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I added the expected code explicitly as a workaround. |
1399 |
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|
1400 |
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Fix 2008/05/06 |
1401 |
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|
1402 |
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@ Add memory quota. |
1403 |
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|
1404 |
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1.5.x returns -ENOMEM when FindNextDomain() failed to create a new |
1405 |
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domain, but I forgot to return -ENOMEM when find_next_domain() failed to |
1406 |
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create a new domain. |
1407 |
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|
1408 |
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A domain is automatically created by find_next_domain() only if |
1409 |
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the domain for the requested program doesn't exist. |
1410 |
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This behavior is for the administrator's convenience. |
1411 |
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The administrator needn't to know how many domains are needed for running |
1412 |
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the whole programs in the system beforehand when developing the policy. |
1413 |
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But the administrator does not want the kernel to reject execution of the |
1414 |
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requested program when developing the policy. |
1415 |
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|
1416 |
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So, I think it is better to grant execution of programs even if |
1417 |
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find_next_domain() failed to create a new domain than reject execution. |
1418 |
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Thus, I decided not to return -ENOMEM when find_next_domain() failed to |
1419 |
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create a new domain. This exception breaks the domain transition rules, |
1420 |
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so I print "transition_failed" warning in /proc/ccs/domain_policy |
1421 |
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when this exception happened. |
1422 |
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|
1423 |
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Also, to prevent the system from being halted by unexpectedly allocating |
1424 |
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all kernel memory for the policy, I added memory quota. |
1425 |
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This quota is configurable via /proc/ccs/meminfo like |
1426 |
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|
1427 |
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echo Shared: 1048576 > /proc/ccs/meminfo |
1428 |
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echo Private: 1048576 > /proc/ccs/meminfo |
1429 |
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|
1430 |
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Version 1.6.1 2008/05/10 Bug fix release. |
1431 |
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|
1432 |
|
Fix 2008/06/04 |
1433 |
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|
1434 |
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@ Check open mode of /proc/ccs/ interface. |
1435 |
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|
1436 |
|
It turned out that I can avoid allocating memory for reading if |
1437 |
|
FMODE_READ is not set and memory for writing if FMODE_WRITE is not set. |
1438 |
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|
1439 |
|
@ Wait for completion of /sbin/ccs-init . |
1440 |
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|
1441 |
|
Since 2.4 kernel's call_usermodehelper() can't wait for termination of |
1442 |
|
the executed program, I was using the close() request of |
1443 |
|
/proc/ccs/meminfo to indicate that loading policy has finished. |
1444 |
|
But since /proc/ccs/meminfo could be accessed for setting memory quota |
1445 |
|
by /etc/ccs/ccs-post-init , I stopped using the close() request. |
1446 |
|
The policy loader no longer need to access /proc/ccs/meminfo to notify |
1447 |
|
the kernel that loading policy has finished. |
1448 |
|
|
1449 |
|
Fix 2008/06/05 |
1450 |
|
|
1451 |
|
@ Fix realpath for pipes and sockets. |
1452 |
|
|
1453 |
|
Kernel 2.6.22 and later use different method for calculating d_path(). |
1454 |
|
Since fs/realpath.c didn't notice the change, the realpath of pipes |
1455 |
|
appeared as "pipe:" rather than "pipe:[\$]" when they are opened via |
1456 |
|
/proc/PID/fd/ directory. |
1457 |
|
|
1458 |
|
@ Add process's information into /proc/ccs/query . |
1459 |
|
|
1460 |
|
While /proc/ccs/grant_log and /proc/ccs/reject_log contain process's |
1461 |
|
information, /proc/ccs/query doesn't contain it. |
1462 |
|
To be able to utilize ccs-queryd and ccs-notifyd more, I added it into |
1463 |
|
/proc/ccs/query . |
1464 |
|
|
1465 |
|
Fix 2008/06/10 |
1466 |
|
|
1467 |
|
@ Allow using patterns for globally readable files. |
1468 |
|
|
1469 |
|
To allow users specify locale specific files to globally readable files, |
1470 |
|
I relaxed checking in update_globally_readable_entry(). |
1471 |
|
|
1472 |
|
Fix 2008/06/11 |
1473 |
|
|
1474 |
|
@ Remove ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE parameter. |
1475 |
|
|
1476 |
|
Since unexpected requests caused by doing software updates can happen |
1477 |
|
in all profiles, users likely have to write ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE=enabled |
1478 |
|
to all profiles. And it makes meaningless to allow users to selectively |
1479 |
|
enable specific profile's ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE parameter. |
1480 |
|
So, I removed ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE parameter. |
1481 |
|
Now, the system behaves as if ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE=enabled is specified. |
1482 |
|
The behavior of "delayed enforcing" mode is defined in the following |
1483 |
|
order. |
1484 |
|
|
1485 |
|
(1) The requests are rejected immediately if nobody is opening |
1486 |
|
/proc/ccs/query interface. |
1487 |
|
(2) The requests will be rejected in 10 seconds if somebody other than |
1488 |
|
ccs-queryd (such as less(1)) is opening /proc/ccs/query interface, |
1489 |
|
for such process doesn't write dummy decisions. |
1490 |
|
|
1491 |
|
Fix 2008/06/22 |
1492 |
|
|
1493 |
|
@ Pass escaped pathname to audit_execute_handler_log(). |
1494 |
|
|
1495 |
|
I was passing unescaped pathname to audit_execute_handler_log() |
1496 |
|
which causes /proc/ccs/grant_log contain whitespace characters |
1497 |
|
if execute handler's pathname contains whitespace characters. |
1498 |
|
|
1499 |
|
Fix 2008/06/25 |
1500 |
|
|
1501 |
|
@ Return 0 when ccs_may_umount() succeeds. |
1502 |
|
|
1503 |
|
I forgot to clear error value in ccs_may_umount() when the requested |
1504 |
|
directory didn't match "deny_unmount" keyword. As a result, any umount() |
1505 |
|
request with RESTRICT_UNMOUNT=enforcing returned -EPERM error. |
1506 |
|
|
1507 |
|
Version 1.6.2 2008/06/25 Usability enhancement release. |
1508 |
|
|
1509 |
|
Fix 2008/07/01 |
1510 |
|
|
1511 |
|
@ Fix "Compilation failure" with 2.4.20 kernel. |
1512 |
|
|
1513 |
|
RedHat Linux 9's 2.4.20 kernel backported O(1) scheduler patch, |
1514 |
|
resulting compilation error at ccs_load_policy(). |
1515 |
|
I added defined(TASK_DEAD) check. |
1516 |
|
|
1517 |
|
Fix 2008/07/08 |
1518 |
|
|
1519 |
|
@ Don't check permissions if vfsmount is NULL. |
1520 |
|
|
1521 |
|
Some filesystems (e.g. unionfs) pass NULL vfsmount. |
1522 |
|
I changed fs/tomoyo_file.c not to try to calculate pathnames |
1523 |
|
if vfsmount is NULL. |
1524 |
|
|
1525 |
|
Version 1.6.3 2008/07/15 Bug fix release. |
1526 |
|
|
1527 |
|
Fix 2008/08/21 |
1528 |
|
|
1529 |
|
@ Add workaround for gcc 4.3's bug. |
1530 |
|
|
1531 |
|
In some environments, fs/tomoyo_network.c could not be compiled |
1532 |
|
because of gcc 4.3's bug. |
1533 |
|
I modified save_ipv6_address() to use "integer literal" value |
1534 |
|
instead for "static const u8" variable. |
1535 |
|
|
1536 |
|
@ Change prototypes of some functions. |
1537 |
|
|
1538 |
|
To support 2.6.27 kernels, I replaced "struct nameidata" with |
1539 |
|
"struct path" for some functions. |
1540 |
|
|
1541 |
|
@ Detect distributor specific patches automatically. |
1542 |
|
|
1543 |
|
Since kernels with AppArmor patch applied is increasing, |
1544 |
|
I introduced a mechanism which determines whether specific patches |
1545 |
|
are applied or not, based on "#define" directives in the patches. |
1546 |
|
|
1547 |
|
Fix 2008/08/29 |
1548 |
|
|
1549 |
|
@ Remove "-ccs" suffix from Makefile's EXTRAVERSION. |
1550 |
|
|
1551 |
|
To reduce conflicts on Makefile's EXTRAVERSION, |
1552 |
|
I removed "-ccs" suffix from ccs-patch-2.\*.diff . |
1553 |
|
Those who build kernels without using specs/build-\*.sh , |
1554 |
|
please edit EXTRAVERSION tag manually so that original kernels |
1555 |
|
will not be overwritten by TOMOYO Linux kernels. |
1556 |
|
|
1557 |
|
Version 1.6.4 2008/09/03 Minor update release. |
1558 |
|
|
1559 |
|
Fix 2008/09/09 |
1560 |
|
|
1561 |
|
@ Add "try again" response to "delayed enforcing" mode. |
1562 |
|
|
1563 |
|
To be able to handle pathname changes caused by software updates, |
1564 |
|
"delayed enforcing" mode was introduced. It allows administrator to |
1565 |
|
grant access requests which are about to be rejected by the kernel. |
1566 |
|
|
1567 |
|
To be able to handle pathname changes caused by software updates better, |
1568 |
|
I introduced "try again" response. As "delayed enforcing" mode sleeps |
1569 |
|
a process which violated policy, administrator can update policy while |
1570 |
|
the process is sleeping. This "try again" response allows administrator |
1571 |
|
to restart policy checks from the beginning after updating policy. |
1572 |
|
|
1573 |
|
Fix 2008/09/11 |
1574 |
|
|
1575 |
|
@ Remember whether the process is allowed to write to /proc/ccs/ interface. |
1576 |
|
|
1577 |
|
Since programs for manipulating policy (e.g. ccs-queryd ) are installed |
1578 |
|
in the form of RPM/DEB packages, these programs lose the original |
1579 |
|
pathnames when they are updated by the package manager. The package |
1580 |
|
manager renames these programs before deleting these programs so that |
1581 |
|
the package manager can rollback the operation. |
1582 |
|
This causes a problem when the programs are listed into /proc/ccs/manager |
1583 |
|
using pathnames, as the programs will no longer be allowed to write to |
1584 |
|
/proc/ccs/ interface while the process of old version of the program is |
1585 |
|
alive. |
1586 |
|
|
1587 |
|
To solve this problem, I modified to remember the fact that the process |
1588 |
|
is once allowed to write to /proc/ccs/ interface until the process |
1589 |
|
attempts to execute a different program. |
1590 |
|
This change makes it impossible to revoke permission to write to |
1591 |
|
/proc/ccs/ interface without killing the process, but it will be better |
1592 |
|
than nonfunctioning ccs-queryd program. |
1593 |
|
|
1594 |
|
Fix 2008/09/19 |
1595 |
|
|
1596 |
|
@ Allow selecting a domain by PID. |
1597 |
|
|
1598 |
|
Sometimes we want to know what ACLs are given to specific PID, but |
1599 |
|
finding a domainname for that PID from /proc/ccs/.process_status and |
1600 |
|
reading ACLs from /proc/ccs/domain_policy by the domainname is very slow. |
1601 |
|
Thus, I modified /proc/ccs/domain_policy to allow selecting a domain by |
1602 |
|
PID. For example, to read domain ACL of current process from bash, |
1603 |
|
run as follows. |
1604 |
|
|
1605 |
|
# exec 100<>/proc/ccs/domain_policy |
1606 |
|
# echo select pid=$$ >&100 |
1607 |
|
# while read -u 100; do echo $REPLY; done |
1608 |
|
|
1609 |
|
If a domain is once selected by PID, reading /proc/ccs/domain_policy will |
1610 |
|
print only that domain if that PID exists or print nothing otherwise. |
1611 |
|
|
1612 |
|
@ Disallow concurrent /proc/ccs/ access using the same file descriptor. |
1613 |
|
|
1614 |
|
Until now, one process can read() from /proc/ccs/ while other process |
1615 |
|
that shares the file descriptor can write() to /proc/ccs/ . |
1616 |
|
But to implement "Allow selecting a domain by PID" feature, I disabled |
1617 |
|
concurrent read()/write() because the feature need to modify read buffer |
1618 |
|
while writing. |
1619 |
|
|
1620 |
|
Fix 2008/10/01 |
1621 |
|
|
1622 |
|
@ Add retry counter into /proc/ccs/query . |
1623 |
|
|
1624 |
|
To be able to handle some of queries from /proc/ccs/query without user's |
1625 |
|
interaction, I added retry counter for avoiding infinite loop caused by |
1626 |
|
"try again" response. |
1627 |
|
|
1628 |
|
Fix 2008/10/07 |
1629 |
|
|
1630 |
|
@ Don't transit to new domain until do_execve() succeeds. |
1631 |
|
|
1632 |
|
Until now, a process's domain was updated to new domain which the process |
1633 |
|
will belongs to before do_execve() succeeds so that the kernel can do |
1634 |
|
permission checks for interpreters and environment variables based on |
1635 |
|
new domain. But this caused a subtle problem when other process sends |
1636 |
|
signals to the process, for the process returns to old domain if |
1637 |
|
do_execve() failed. |
1638 |
|
|
1639 |
|
So, I modified to pass new domain to functions so that I can avoid |
1640 |
|
modifying a process's domain before do_execve() succeeds. |
1641 |
|
|
1642 |
|
@ Use old task state for audit logs. |
1643 |
|
|
1644 |
|
Until now, audit logs were generated using the task state after |
1645 |
|
processing "; set task.state" part. But to generate accurate logs, |
1646 |
|
I modified to save the task state before processing "; set task.state" |
1647 |
|
part and use the saved state for audit logs. |
1648 |
|
|
1649 |
|
@ Use a structure for passing parameters. |
1650 |
|
|
1651 |
|
As the number of parameters is increasing, I modified to use a structure |
1652 |
|
for passing parameters. |
1653 |
|
|
1654 |
|
@ Always allow updating task state for signal operations. |
1655 |
|
|
1656 |
|
ccs_check_signal_acl() was skipping permission checks if signal is NULL |
1657 |
|
or sent to self or sent to same domain. To make it possible to update |
1658 |
|
task state when current process is sending NULL signal or to self or |
1659 |
|
to same domain, I modified to check ACL anyway. The result of access |
1660 |
|
control will not change, but this modification will generate granted logs |
1661 |
|
which were not generated until now. |