| 1 |
Notes for TOMOYO Linux project |
Notes for TOMOYO Linux project |
| 2 |
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| 3 |
This is a handy Mandatory Access Control patch for Linux kernels. |
This is a handy Mandatory Access Control patch for Linux kernels. |
| 4 |
This patch is released under the GPL. |
This patch is released under the GPLv2. |
| 5 |
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| 6 |
Project URL: http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/ |
Project URL: http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/ |
| 7 |
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| 475 |
succeeds to invoke do_execve() with filename = "/bin/ls" and |
succeeds to invoke do_execve() with filename = "/bin/ls" and |
| 476 |
argv[0] = "/bin/cat". |
argv[0] = "/bin/cat". |
| 477 |
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|
| 478 |
I introduced a keyword that permits the mismatch of |
I introduced a directive that permits the mismatch of |
| 479 |
basename of filename and argv[0]. |
basename of filename and argv[0]. |
| 480 |
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|
| 481 |
Fix 2006/08/10 |
Fix 2006/08/10 |
| 933 |
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| 934 |
@ Fix ReadAddressGroupPolicy() bug. |
@ Fix ReadAddressGroupPolicy() bug. |
| 935 |
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| 936 |
ReadAddressGroupPolicy() fails if both "path_group" and "address_group" are used |
ReadAddressGroupPolicy() fails if both "path_group" and "address_group" |
| 937 |
because I forgot to set "head->read_var1 = NULL". |
are used because I forgot to set "head->read_var1 = NULL". |
| 938 |
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| 939 |
Fix 2007/07/10 |
Fix 2007/07/10 |
| 940 |
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| 949 |
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| 950 |
@ Remove mount-flags manipulation. |
@ Remove mount-flags manipulation. |
| 951 |
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| 952 |
Until now, administrator is permitted to turn on/off specific mount options |
Until now, administrator is permitted to turn on/off specific mount |
| 953 |
regardless of mount options passed to kernel. |
options regardless of mount options passed to kernel. |
| 954 |
I removed this feature because "exact option matching" sounds better than |
I removed this feature because "exact option matching" sounds better than |
| 955 |
"automatic option enabler/disabler". |
"automatic option enabler/disabler". |
| 956 |
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|
| 957 |
@ Remove /proc/ccs/info/mapping . |
@ Remove /proc/ccs/info/mapping . |
| 958 |
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| 959 |
I removed /proc/ccs/info/mapping because nobody seems to use this feature. |
I removed /proc/ccs/info/mapping because nobody seems to use this |
| 960 |
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feature. |
| 961 |
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|
| 962 |
@ Call external policy loader automatically. |
@ Call external policy loader automatically. |
| 963 |
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|
| 981 |
can handle interactive operations by opening /dev/console . |
can handle interactive operations by opening /dev/console . |
| 982 |
Now, there is no difference between init=/sbin/ccs-init and |
Now, there is no difference between init=/sbin/ccs-init and |
| 983 |
call_usermodehelper("/sbin/ccs-init"), and users no longer need to |
call_usermodehelper("/sbin/ccs-init"), and users no longer need to |
| 984 |
add init=/sbin/ccs-init parameter to load policy before /sbin/init starts. |
add init=/sbin/ccs-init parameter to load policy before /sbin/init |
| 985 |
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starts. |
| 986 |
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| 987 |
Fix 2007/08/14 |
Fix 2007/08/14 |
| 988 |
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| 1103 |
To my surprise, "mount --bind source dest" accepts |
To my surprise, "mount --bind source dest" accepts |
| 1104 |
not only "both source and dest are directory" |
not only "both source and dest are directory" |
| 1105 |
but also "both source and dest are non-directory". |
but also "both source and dest are non-directory". |
| 1106 |
I was rejecting if dest is not a derectory in AddMountACL(). |
I was rejecting if dest is not a directory in AddMountACL(). |
| 1107 |
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| 1108 |
@ Change log format. |
@ Change log format. |
| 1109 |
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|
| 1110 |
Profile number and mode is added in audit logs. |
Profile number and mode is added in audit logs. |
| 1111 |
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| 1112 |
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Fix 2008/01/03 |
| 1113 |
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| 1114 |
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@ Change directive for file's read/write/execute permission. |
| 1115 |
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| 1116 |
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Directives for file's read/write/execute permissions were |
| 1117 |
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4/2/1 respectively. But for easier understanding, they are now |
| 1118 |
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replaced by read/write/execute (e.g. "allow_read" instead of "4"). |
| 1119 |
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But for easier inputting, 4/2/1 are still accepted instead of |
| 1120 |
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allow_read/allow_write/allow_execute respectively. |
| 1121 |
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| 1122 |
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@ Change internal data structure. |
| 1123 |
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| 1124 |
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Since I don't have more than 16 types of file permissions, |
| 1125 |
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I combined them using bit-fields. |
| 1126 |
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| 1127 |
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Each entry had a field for conditional permission support. |
| 1128 |
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But since this field is unlikely used, I separated the field from |
| 1129 |
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common part. |
| 1130 |
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| 1131 |
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These changes will reduce memory used by policy. |
| 1132 |
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| 1133 |
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Fix 2008/01/15 |
| 1134 |
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| 1135 |
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@ Add ptrace() hook. |
| 1136 |
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| 1137 |
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To prevent attackers from controlling important processes using |
| 1138 |
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ptrace(), I added a hook for ptrace(). |
| 1139 |
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Most programs (except strace(1) and gdb(1)) won't use ptrace(2). |
| 1140 |
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| 1141 |
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@ Fix sleep condition check in CheckSocketRecvDatagramPermission(). |
| 1142 |
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| 1143 |
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It seems that correct method to use is in_atomic() |
| 1144 |
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rather than in_interrupt() because in_atomic() returns nonzero |
| 1145 |
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whenever scheduling is not allowed. |
| 1146 |
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| 1147 |
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Fix 2008/02/05 |
| 1148 |
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| 1149 |
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@ Use find_task_by_vpid() instead of find_task_by_pid(). |
| 1150 |
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| 1151 |
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Kernel 2.6.24 introduced PID namespace. |
| 1152 |
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To search PID given from userland, the kernel needs to use |
| 1153 |
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find_task_by_vpid() instead of find_task_by_pid(). |
| 1154 |
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| 1155 |
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Fix 2008/02/14 |
| 1156 |
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| 1157 |
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@ Add execve() parameter checking. |
| 1158 |
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| 1159 |
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Until now, it was impossible to check argv[] and envp[] parameters |
| 1160 |
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passed to execve(). |
| 1161 |
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I expanded conditional permission syntax so that |
| 1162 |
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{ argc, envc, argv[] , envp[] } parameters can be checked if needed. |
| 1163 |
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This will allow administrator permit execution of /bin/sh only when |
| 1164 |
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/bin/sh is invoked in the form of "/bin/sh -c" and environment variable |
| 1165 |
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HOME is set by specifying |
| 1166 |
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| 1167 |
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allow_execute /bin/sh if exec.argv[1]="-c" exec.envp["HOME"]!=NULL |
| 1168 |
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| 1169 |
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in the policy. |
| 1170 |
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This extension will make exploit codes difficult to start /bin/sh because |
| 1171 |
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they unlikely set up environment variables and unlikely specify "-c" |
| 1172 |
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option when invoking /bin/sh , whereas proper functions likely set up |
| 1173 |
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environment variables and likely specify "-c" option. |
| 1174 |
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| 1175 |
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Fix 2008/02/18 |
| 1176 |
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| 1177 |
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@ Add process state checking. |
| 1178 |
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| 1179 |
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Until now, it was impossible to change ACL without executing program. |
| 1180 |
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I added three variables for performing stateful checking within a domain. |
| 1181 |
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You can set current process's state like: |
| 1182 |
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| 1183 |
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allow_network TCP accept @TRUSTED_HOSTS 1024-65535 ; set task.state[0]=1 |
| 1184 |
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allow_network TCP accept @UNTRUSTED_HOSTS 1024-65535 ; set task.state[0]=0 |
| 1185 |
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|
| 1186 |
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and you can use the state like |
| 1187 |
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| 1188 |
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allow_read /path/to/important/file if task.state[0]=1 |
| 1189 |
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| 1190 |
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in the policy. |
| 1191 |
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The state changes when the request was granted by the MAC's policy, |
| 1192 |
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so please be careful with situations where the state has changed |
| 1193 |
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successfully but the request was not processed because of other reasons |
| 1194 |
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(e.g. out of memory). |
| 1195 |
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| 1196 |
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Fix 2008/02/26 |
| 1197 |
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|
| 1198 |
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@ Support /proc/ccs/ access by non-root user. |
| 1199 |
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| 1200 |
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Until now, only root user can access /proc/ccs/ interface. |
| 1201 |
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But to permit /proc/ccs/ access by non-root user so that it won't require |
| 1202 |
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ssh login by root user when administrating from remote host, |
| 1203 |
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I made "(current->uid == 0 && current->euid == 0)" requirement optional. |
| 1204 |
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If this requirement is disabled, only "conventional DAC permission |
| 1205 |
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checks" and "/proc/ccs/manager checks" are used. |
| 1206 |
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| 1207 |
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Fix 2008/02/29 |
| 1208 |
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| 1209 |
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@ Add sleep_on_violation feature. |
| 1210 |
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| 1211 |
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Some exploit codes (e.g. trans2open for Samba) continue running |
| 1212 |
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until it achieves the purpose of the exploit code (e.g. invoke /bin/sh). |
| 1213 |
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|
| 1214 |
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If such code is injected due to buffer overflow but the kernel |
| 1215 |
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rejects the request, it triggers infinite "Permission denied" loop. |
| 1216 |
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As a result, the CPU usage becomes 100% and gives bad effects to |
| 1217 |
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the rest of processes. |
| 1218 |
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This is a side effect of rejecting the request from the exploit code |
| 1219 |
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which wouldn't happen if the request from the exploit code was granted. |
| 1220 |
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| 1221 |
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To avoid such CPU consumption, I added a penalty that forcibly |
| 1222 |
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sleeps for specified period when a request is rejected. |
| 1223 |
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| 1224 |
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This penalty doesn't work if the exploit code does nothing but |
| 1225 |
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continue running, but I think most exploit code's purpose is |
| 1226 |
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to start some program rather than to slow down the target system. |
| 1227 |
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| 1228 |
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@ Add alt_exec feature. |
| 1229 |
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| 1230 |
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Since TOMOYO Linux's approach is "know all essential requests in advance |
| 1231 |
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and create policy that permits only them", you can regard anomalous |
| 1232 |
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requests as attacks (if you want to do so). |
| 1233 |
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| 1234 |
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Common MAC implementations merely reject requests that violate policy. |
| 1235 |
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But I added a special handler for execve() to TOMOYO Linux. |
| 1236 |
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| 1237 |
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This handler is triggered when a process requested to execute a program |
| 1238 |
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but the request was rejected by the policy. |
| 1239 |
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This handler executes a program specified by the administrator |
| 1240 |
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instead of a program requested by the process. |
| 1241 |
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| 1242 |
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Most attackers attempt to execute /bin/sh to start something malicious. |
| 1243 |
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Attackers execute an exploit code using buffer overflow vulnerability |
| 1244 |
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to steal control of a process. But this handler can get back control |
| 1245 |
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if an exploit code requests execve() that is not permitted by policy. |
| 1246 |
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| 1247 |
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By default, this handler does nothing (i.e. merely reject execve() |
| 1248 |
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request). You can specify any program to start what you want to do. |
| 1249 |
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|
| 1250 |
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You can redirect attackers to somewhere else (e.g. honey pot). |
| 1251 |
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This makes it possible to act your Linux box as an on-demand honey pot |
| 1252 |
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while keeping regular services for your usage. |
| 1253 |
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| 1254 |
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You can collect information of the attacker (e.g. IP address) and |
| 1255 |
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update firewall configuration. |
| 1256 |
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| 1257 |
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You can silently terminate a process who requested execve() |
| 1258 |
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that is not permitted by policy. |
| 1259 |
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| 1260 |
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Fix 2008/03/03 |
| 1261 |
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| 1262 |
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@ Add "force_alt_exec" directive. |
| 1263 |
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| 1264 |
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To be able to fully utilize "alt_exec" feature, |
| 1265 |
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I added "force_alt_exec" directive so that |
| 1266 |
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all execute requests are replaced by the execute request of a program |
| 1267 |
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specified by alt_exec feature. |
| 1268 |
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| 1269 |
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If this directive is specified for a domain, the domain no longer |
| 1270 |
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executes any programs regardless of the mode of file access control |
| 1271 |
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(i.e. the domain won't execute even if MAC_FOR_FILE=0 ). |
| 1272 |
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Instead, the domain executes the program specified by alt_exec feature |
| 1273 |
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and the program specified by alt_exec feature validates the execute |
| 1274 |
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request and executes it if it is appropriate to execute. |
| 1275 |
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| 1276 |
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If you can tolerate that there is no chance to return an error code |
| 1277 |
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to the caller to tell the execute request was rejected, |
| 1278 |
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this is more flexible approach than in-kernel execve() parameter |
| 1279 |
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checking because we can do argv[] and envp[] checking easily. |
| 1280 |
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| 1281 |
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Fix 2008/03/04 |
| 1282 |
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| 1283 |
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@ Use string for access control mode. |
| 1284 |
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| 1285 |
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An integer expression for access control mode sometimes confuses |
| 1286 |
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administrators because profile number is also an integer expression. |
| 1287 |
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To avoid confusion between profile number and access control mode, |
| 1288 |
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I introduced a string expression for access control mode. |
| 1289 |
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| 1290 |
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Modes which take an integer between 0 and 3. |
| 1291 |
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| 1292 |
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0 -> disabled |
| 1293 |
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1 -> learning |
| 1294 |
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2 -> permissive |
| 1295 |
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3 -> enforcing |
| 1296 |
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| 1297 |
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Modes which take 0 or 1. |
| 1298 |
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| 1299 |
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0 -> disabled |
| 1300 |
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1 -> enabled |
| 1301 |
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| 1302 |
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Fix 2008/03/10 |
| 1303 |
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| 1304 |
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@ Rename "force_alt_exec" directive to "execute_handler". |
| 1305 |
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| 1306 |
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To be able to use different programs for validating execve() parameters, |
| 1307 |
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I moved the location to specify the program's pathname from profile |
| 1308 |
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to domain policy. |
| 1309 |
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| 1310 |
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The "execute_handler" directive takes one pathname which is |
| 1311 |
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invoked whenever execve() request is issued. Thus, any "allow_execute" |
| 1312 |
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directives in a domain with "execute_handler" are ignored. |
| 1313 |
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This directive is designed for validating expected/desirable execve() |
| 1314 |
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requests in userspace, although there is no way to tell the caller |
| 1315 |
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that the execve() request was rejected. |
| 1316 |
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| 1317 |
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@ Rename "alt_exec" directive to "denied_execute_handler". |
| 1318 |
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|
| 1319 |
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The "denied_execute_handler" directive takes one pathname which is |
| 1320 |
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invoked only when execve() request was rejected. In other words, |
| 1321 |
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this program is invoked only when the following conditions are met. |
| 1322 |
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| 1323 |
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(1) None of "allow_execute" directives in the domain matched. |
| 1324 |
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(2) The execve() request was rejected in enforcing mode. |
| 1325 |
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(3) "execute_handler" directive is not used by the domain. |
| 1326 |
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| 1327 |
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This directive is designed for handling unexpected/undesirable execve() |
| 1328 |
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requests, to redirect the process issuing such requests to somewhere. |
| 1329 |
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| 1330 |
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Fix 2008/03/18 |
| 1331 |
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| 1332 |
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@ Fix wrong/redundant locks in pre-vfs functions. |
| 1333 |
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|
| 1334 |
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lock_kernel()/unlock_kernel() in pre_vfs_rename() were redundant for |
| 1335 |
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2.6 kernels. |
| 1336 |
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|
| 1337 |
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Locking order in pre_vfs_link() and pre_vfs_unlink() for 2.4 kernels |
| 1338 |
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after 2.4.33 were different from before 2.4.32 . |
| 1339 |
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|
| 1340 |
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Fix 2008/03/28 |
| 1341 |
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|
| 1342 |
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@ Disable execute handler loop. |
| 1343 |
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| 1344 |
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To be able to use "execute_handler" in a "keep_domain" domain, |
| 1345 |
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ignore "execute_handler" and "denied_execute_handler" directives |
| 1346 |
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if the current process is executing programs specified by |
| 1347 |
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"execute_handler" or "denied_execute_handler" directive. |
| 1348 |
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|
| 1349 |
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This exception is needed to avoid infinite execute handler loop. |
| 1350 |
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If a domain has both "keep_domain" and "execute_handler", |
| 1351 |
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any execute request by that domain is handled by an execute handler, |
| 1352 |
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and the execute handler attempts to process original execute request. |
| 1353 |
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But the original execute request is handled by the same execute handler |
| 1354 |
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unless the execute handler ignores "execute_handler". |
| 1355 |
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|
| 1356 |
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@ Update coding style. |
| 1357 |
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|
| 1358 |
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I rewrote the code to pass scripts/checkpatch.pl as much as possible. |
| 1359 |
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Function names were changed to use only lower letters. |
| 1360 |
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|
| 1361 |
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Version 1.6.0 2008/04/01 Feature enhancement release. |
| 1362 |
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|
| 1363 |
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Fix 2008/04/14 |
| 1364 |
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|
| 1365 |
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@ Fix "Compilation failures" and "Initialization ordering bugs" |
| 1366 |
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with kernels before 2.4.30/2.6.11 . |
| 1367 |
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|
| 1368 |
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2.6 kernels before 2.6.9 didn't have include/linux/hardirq.h , |
| 1369 |
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resulting compilation error at #include <linux/hardirq.h> . |
| 1370 |
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I added #elif condition. |
| 1371 |
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|
| 1372 |
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CentOS 4.6's 2.6.9 kernel calls do_execve() before initialization of |
| 1373 |
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ccs_alloc(), resulting NULL pointer dereference. |
| 1374 |
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I changed __initcall to core_initcall. |
| 1375 |
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|
| 1376 |
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CentOS 4.6's 2.6.9 kernel backported kzalloc() from 2.6.14 , |
| 1377 |
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resulting compilation error at kzalloc(). |
| 1378 |
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I modified prototype of kzalloc(). |
| 1379 |
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|
| 1380 |
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Fix 2008/04/20 |
| 1381 |
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|
| 1382 |
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@ Fix "Compilation failures" with kernels before 2.4.30/2.6.11 . |
| 1383 |
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|
| 1384 |
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Turbolinux 10 Server's 2.6.8 kernel backported kzalloc() as an inlined |
| 1385 |
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function, resulting compilation error at kzalloc(). |
| 1386 |
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I converted kzalloc() from an inlined function into a macro. |
| 1387 |
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|
| 1388 |
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Fix 2008/04/21 |
| 1389 |
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|
| 1390 |
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@ Add workaround for gcc 3.2.2's inline bug. |
| 1391 |
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|
| 1392 |
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RedHat Linux 9's gcc 3.2.2 generated a bad code |
| 1393 |
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if ((var_of_u8 & 0x000000BF) & 0x80000000) { } |
| 1394 |
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where the expected code is |
| 1395 |
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if ((var_of_u8 & 0xBF) & 0x80) { } |
| 1396 |
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when embedding ccs_acl_type2() into print_entry(), |
| 1397 |
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resulting runtime BUG(). |
| 1398 |
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I added the expected code explicitly as a workaround. |
| 1399 |
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|
| 1400 |
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Fix 2008/05/06 |
| 1401 |
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|
| 1402 |
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@ Add memory quota. |
| 1403 |
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|
| 1404 |
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1.5.x returns -ENOMEM when FindNextDomain() failed to create a new |
| 1405 |
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domain, but I forgot to return -ENOMEM when find_next_domain() failed to |
| 1406 |
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create a new domain. |
| 1407 |
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|
| 1408 |
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A domain is automatically created by find_next_domain() only if |
| 1409 |
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the domain for the requested program doesn't exist. |
| 1410 |
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This behavior is for the administrator's convenience. |
| 1411 |
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The administrator needn't to know how many domains are needed for running |
| 1412 |
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the whole programs in the system beforehand when developing the policy. |
| 1413 |
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But the administrator does not want the kernel to reject execution of the |
| 1414 |
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requested program when developing the policy. |
| 1415 |
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|
| 1416 |
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So, I think it is better to grant execution of programs even if |
| 1417 |
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find_next_domain() failed to create a new domain than reject execution. |
| 1418 |
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Thus, I decided not to return -ENOMEM when find_next_domain() failed to |
| 1419 |
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create a new domain. This exception breaks the domain transition rules, |
| 1420 |
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so I print "transition_failed" warning in /proc/ccs/domain_policy |
| 1421 |
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when this exception happened. |
| 1422 |
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|
| 1423 |
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Also, to prevent the system from being halted by unexpectedly allocating |
| 1424 |
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all kernel memory for the policy, I added memory quota. |
| 1425 |
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This quota is configurable via /proc/ccs/meminfo like |
| 1426 |
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|
| 1427 |
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echo Shared: 1048576 > /proc/ccs/meminfo |
| 1428 |
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echo Private: 1048576 > /proc/ccs/meminfo |
| 1429 |
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|
| 1430 |
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Version 1.6.1 2008/05/10 Bug fix release. |
| 1431 |
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|
| 1432 |
|
Fix 2008/06/04 |
| 1433 |
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|
| 1434 |
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@ Check open mode of /proc/ccs/ interface. |
| 1435 |
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|
| 1436 |
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It turned out that I can avoid allocating memory for reading if |
| 1437 |
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FMODE_READ is not set and memory for writing if FMODE_WRITE is not set. |
| 1438 |
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|
| 1439 |
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@ Wait for completion of /sbin/ccs-init . |
| 1440 |
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|
| 1441 |
|
Since 2.4 kernel's call_usermodehelper() can't wait for termination of |
| 1442 |
|
the executed program, I was using the close() request of |
| 1443 |
|
/proc/ccs/meminfo to indicate that loading policy has finished. |
| 1444 |
|
But since /proc/ccs/meminfo could be accessed for setting memory quota |
| 1445 |
|
by /etc/ccs/ccs-post-init , I stopped using the close() request. |
| 1446 |
|
The policy loader no longer need to access /proc/ccs/meminfo to notify |
| 1447 |
|
the kernel that loading policy has finished. |
| 1448 |
|
|
| 1449 |
|
Fix 2008/06/05 |
| 1450 |
|
|
| 1451 |
|
@ Fix realpath for pipes and sockets. |
| 1452 |
|
|
| 1453 |
|
Kernel 2.6.22 and later use different method for calculating d_path(). |
| 1454 |
|
Since fs/realpath.c didn't notice the change, the realpath of pipes |
| 1455 |
|
appeared as "pipe:" rather than "pipe:[\$]" when they are opened via |
| 1456 |
|
/proc/PID/fd/ directory. |
| 1457 |
|
|
| 1458 |
|
@ Add process's information into /proc/ccs/query . |
| 1459 |
|
|
| 1460 |
|
While /proc/ccs/grant_log and /proc/ccs/reject_log contain process's |
| 1461 |
|
information, /proc/ccs/query doesn't contain it. |
| 1462 |
|
To be able to utilize ccs-queryd and ccs-notifyd more, I added it into |
| 1463 |
|
/proc/ccs/query . |
| 1464 |
|
|
| 1465 |
|
Fix 2008/06/10 |
| 1466 |
|
|
| 1467 |
|
@ Allow using patterns for globally readable files. |
| 1468 |
|
|
| 1469 |
|
To allow users specify locale specific files to globally readable files, |
| 1470 |
|
I relaxed checking in update_globally_readable_entry(). |
| 1471 |
|
|
| 1472 |
|
Fix 2008/06/11 |
| 1473 |
|
|
| 1474 |
|
@ Remove ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE parameter. |
| 1475 |
|
|
| 1476 |
|
Since unexpected requests caused by doing software updates can happen |
| 1477 |
|
in all profiles, users likely have to write ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE=enabled |
| 1478 |
|
to all profiles. And it makes meaningless to allow users to selectively |
| 1479 |
|
enable specific profile's ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE parameter. |
| 1480 |
|
So, I removed ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE parameter. |
| 1481 |
|
Now, the system behaves as if ALLOW_ENFORCE_GRACE=enabled is specified. |
| 1482 |
|
The behavior of "delayed enforcing" mode is defined in the following |
| 1483 |
|
order. |
| 1484 |
|
|
| 1485 |
|
(1) The requests are rejected immediately if nobody is opening |
| 1486 |
|
/proc/ccs/query interface. |
| 1487 |
|
(2) The requests will be rejected in 10 seconds if somebody other than |
| 1488 |
|
ccs-queryd (such as less(1)) is opening /proc/ccs/query interface, |
| 1489 |
|
for such process doesn't write dummy decisions. |
| 1490 |
|
|
| 1491 |
|
Fix 2008/06/22 |
| 1492 |
|
|
| 1493 |
|
@ Pass escaped pathname to audit_execute_handler_log(). |
| 1494 |
|
|
| 1495 |
|
I was passing unescaped pathname to audit_execute_handler_log() |
| 1496 |
|
which causes /proc/ccs/grant_log contain whitespace characters |
| 1497 |
|
if execute handler's pathname contains whitespace characters. |
| 1498 |
|
|
| 1499 |
|
Fix 2008/06/25 |
| 1500 |
|
|
| 1501 |
|
@ Return 0 when ccs_may_umount() succeeds. |
| 1502 |
|
|
| 1503 |
|
I forgot to clear error value in ccs_may_umount() when the requested |
| 1504 |
|
directory didn't match "deny_unmount" directive. As a result, any umount() |
| 1505 |
|
request with RESTRICT_UNMOUNT=enforcing returned -EPERM error. |
| 1506 |
|
|
| 1507 |
|
Version 1.6.2 2008/06/25 Usability enhancement release. |
| 1508 |
|
|
| 1509 |
|
Fix 2008/07/01 |
| 1510 |
|
|
| 1511 |
|
@ Fix "Compilation failure" with 2.4.20 kernel. |
| 1512 |
|
|
| 1513 |
|
RedHat Linux 9's 2.4.20 kernel backported O(1) scheduler patch, |
| 1514 |
|
resulting compilation error at ccs_load_policy(). |
| 1515 |
|
I added defined(TASK_DEAD) check. |
| 1516 |
|
|
| 1517 |
|
Fix 2008/07/08 |
| 1518 |
|
|
| 1519 |
|
@ Don't check permissions if vfsmount is NULL. |
| 1520 |
|
|
| 1521 |
|
Some filesystems (e.g. unionfs) pass NULL vfsmount. |
| 1522 |
|
I changed fs/tomoyo_file.c not to try to calculate pathnames |
| 1523 |
|
if vfsmount is NULL. |
| 1524 |
|
|
| 1525 |
|
Version 1.6.3 2008/07/15 Bug fix release. |
| 1526 |
|
|
| 1527 |
|
Fix 2008/08/21 |
| 1528 |
|
|
| 1529 |
|
@ Add workaround for gcc 4.3's bug. |
| 1530 |
|
|
| 1531 |
|
In some environments, fs/tomoyo_network.c could not be compiled |
| 1532 |
|
because of gcc 4.3's bug. |
| 1533 |
|
I modified save_ipv6_address() to use "integer literal" value |
| 1534 |
|
instead for "static const u8" variable. |
| 1535 |
|
|
| 1536 |
|
@ Change prototypes of some functions. |
| 1537 |
|
|
| 1538 |
|
To support 2.6.27 kernels, I replaced "struct nameidata" with |
| 1539 |
|
"struct path" for some functions. |
| 1540 |
|
|
| 1541 |
|
@ Detect distributor specific patches automatically. |
| 1542 |
|
|
| 1543 |
|
Since kernels with AppArmor patch applied is increasing, |
| 1544 |
|
I introduced a mechanism which determines whether specific patches |
| 1545 |
|
are applied or not, based on "#define" directives in the patches. |
| 1546 |
|
|
| 1547 |
|
Fix 2008/08/29 |
| 1548 |
|
|
| 1549 |
|
@ Remove "-ccs" suffix from Makefile's EXTRAVERSION. |
| 1550 |
|
|
| 1551 |
|
To reduce conflicts on Makefile's EXTRAVERSION, |
| 1552 |
|
I removed "-ccs" suffix from ccs-patch-2.\*.diff . |
| 1553 |
|
Those who build kernels without using specs/build-\*.sh , |
| 1554 |
|
please edit EXTRAVERSION tag manually so that original kernels |
| 1555 |
|
will not be overwritten by TOMOYO Linux kernels. |
| 1556 |
|
|
| 1557 |
|
Version 1.6.4 2008/09/03 Minor update release. |
| 1558 |
|
|
| 1559 |
|
Fix 2008/09/09 |
| 1560 |
|
|
| 1561 |
|
@ Add "try again" response to "delayed enforcing" mode. |
| 1562 |
|
|
| 1563 |
|
To be able to handle pathname changes caused by software updates, |
| 1564 |
|
"delayed enforcing" mode was introduced. It allows administrator to |
| 1565 |
|
grant access requests which are about to be rejected by the kernel. |
| 1566 |
|
|
| 1567 |
|
To be able to handle pathname changes caused by software updates better, |
| 1568 |
|
I introduced "try again" response. As "delayed enforcing" mode sleeps |
| 1569 |
|
a process which violated policy, administrator can update policy while |
| 1570 |
|
the process is sleeping. This "try again" response allows administrator |
| 1571 |
|
to restart policy checks from the beginning after updating policy. |
| 1572 |
|
|
| 1573 |
|
Fix 2008/09/11 |
| 1574 |
|
|
| 1575 |
|
@ Remember whether the process is allowed to write to /proc/ccs/ interface. |
| 1576 |
|
|
| 1577 |
|
Since programs for manipulating policy (e.g. ccs-queryd ) are installed |
| 1578 |
|
in the form of RPM/DEB packages, these programs lose the original |
| 1579 |
|
pathnames when they are updated by the package manager. The package |
| 1580 |
|
manager renames these programs before deleting these programs so that |
| 1581 |
|
the package manager can rollback the operation. |
| 1582 |
|
This causes a problem when the programs are listed into /proc/ccs/manager |
| 1583 |
|
using pathnames, as the programs will no longer be allowed to write to |
| 1584 |
|
/proc/ccs/ interface while the process of old version of the program is |
| 1585 |
|
alive. |
| 1586 |
|
|
| 1587 |
|
To solve this problem, I modified to remember the fact that the process |
| 1588 |
|
is once allowed to write to /proc/ccs/ interface until the process |
| 1589 |
|
attempts to execute a different program. |
| 1590 |
|
This change makes it impossible to revoke permission to write to |
| 1591 |
|
/proc/ccs/ interface without killing the process, but it will be better |
| 1592 |
|
than nonfunctioning ccs-queryd program. |
| 1593 |
|
|
| 1594 |
|
Fix 2008/09/19 |
| 1595 |
|
|
| 1596 |
|
@ Allow selecting a domain by PID. |
| 1597 |
|
|
| 1598 |
|
Sometimes we want to know what ACLs are given to specific PID, but |
| 1599 |
|
finding a domainname for that PID from /proc/ccs/.process_status and |
| 1600 |
|
reading ACLs from /proc/ccs/domain_policy by the domainname is very slow. |
| 1601 |
|
Thus, I modified /proc/ccs/domain_policy to allow selecting a domain by |
| 1602 |
|
PID. For example, to read domain ACL of current process from bash, |
| 1603 |
|
run as follows. |
| 1604 |
|
|
| 1605 |
|
# exec 100<>/proc/ccs/domain_policy |
| 1606 |
|
# echo select pid=$$ >&100 |
| 1607 |
|
# while read -u 100; do echo $REPLY; done |
| 1608 |
|
|
| 1609 |
|
If a domain is once selected by PID, reading /proc/ccs/domain_policy will |
| 1610 |
|
print only that domain if that PID exists or print nothing otherwise. |
| 1611 |
|
|
| 1612 |
|
@ Disallow concurrent /proc/ccs/ access using the same file descriptor. |
| 1613 |
|
|
| 1614 |
|
Until now, one process can read() from /proc/ccs/ while other process |
| 1615 |
|
that shares the file descriptor can write() to /proc/ccs/ . |
| 1616 |
|
But to implement "Allow selecting a domain by PID" feature, I disabled |
| 1617 |
|
concurrent read()/write() because the feature need to modify read buffer |
| 1618 |
|
while writing. |
| 1619 |
|
|
| 1620 |
|
Fix 2008/10/01 |
| 1621 |
|
|
| 1622 |
|
@ Add retry counter into /proc/ccs/query . |
| 1623 |
|
|
| 1624 |
|
To be able to handle some of queries from /proc/ccs/query without user's |
| 1625 |
|
interaction, I added retry counter for avoiding infinite loop caused by |
| 1626 |
|
"try again" response. |
| 1627 |
|
|
| 1628 |
|
Fix 2008/10/07 |
| 1629 |
|
|
| 1630 |
|
@ Don't transit to new domain until do_execve() succeeds. |
| 1631 |
|
|
| 1632 |
|
Until now, a process's domain was updated to new domain which the process |
| 1633 |
|
will belong to before do_execve() succeeds so that the kernel can do |
| 1634 |
|
permission checks for interpreters and environment variables based on |
| 1635 |
|
new domain. But this caused a subtle problem when other process sends |
| 1636 |
|
signals to the process, for the process returns to old domain if |
| 1637 |
|
do_execve() failed. |
| 1638 |
|
|
| 1639 |
|
So, I modified to pass new domain to functions so that I can avoid |
| 1640 |
|
modifying a process's domain before do_execve() succeeds. |
| 1641 |
|
|
| 1642 |
|
@ Use old task state for audit logs. |
| 1643 |
|
|
| 1644 |
|
Until now, audit logs were generated using the task state after |
| 1645 |
|
processing "; set task.state" part. But to generate accurate logs, |
| 1646 |
|
I modified to save the task state before processing "; set task.state" |
| 1647 |
|
part and use the saved state for audit logs. |
| 1648 |
|
|
| 1649 |
|
@ Use a structure for passing parameters. |
| 1650 |
|
|
| 1651 |
|
As the number of parameters is increasing, I modified to use a structure |
| 1652 |
|
for passing parameters. |
| 1653 |
|
|
| 1654 |
|
Fix 2008/10/11 |
| 1655 |
|
|
| 1656 |
|
@ Remove domain_acl_lock mutex. |
| 1657 |
|
|
| 1658 |
|
I noticed that I don't need to keep all functions that modify an ACL of |
| 1659 |
|
a domain mutually exclusive. Since each functions handles different type |
| 1660 |
|
of ACL, locking is needed only when they append an ACL to a domain. |
| 1661 |
|
So, I modified to use local locks. |
| 1662 |
|
|
| 1663 |
|
Fix 2008/10/14 |
| 1664 |
|
|
| 1665 |
|
@ Fix ccs_check_condition() bug. |
| 1666 |
|
|
| 1667 |
|
Due to a bug in ccs_check_condition(), it was impossible to use |
| 1668 |
|
task.state[0] task.state[1] task.state[2] inside condition part |
| 1669 |
|
if the ACL does not treat a pathname. For example, an ACL like |
| 1670 |
|
|
| 1671 |
|
allow_network TCP connect @HTTP_SERVERS 80 if task.state[0]=100 |
| 1672 |
|
|
| 1673 |
|
didn't work. |
| 1674 |
|
|
| 1675 |
|
Fix 2008/10/15 |
| 1676 |
|
|
| 1677 |
|
@ Show process information in /proc/ccs/.process_status . |
| 1678 |
|
|
| 1679 |
|
To be able to determine a process's type, I added a command "info PID" |
| 1680 |
|
which returns process information of the specified PID in |
| 1681 |
|
"PID manager=\* execute_handler=\* state[0]=\$ state[1]=\$ state[2]=\$" |
| 1682 |
|
format. |
| 1683 |
|
|
| 1684 |
|
Fix 2008/10/20 |
| 1685 |
|
|
| 1686 |
|
@ Use rcu_dereference() when walking the list. |
| 1687 |
|
|
| 1688 |
|
I was using "dependency ordering" for appending an element to a list |
| 1689 |
|
without asking the reader to take a lock. But "dependency ordering" |
| 1690 |
|
is not respected by DEC Alpha or by some aggressive value-speculation |
| 1691 |
|
compiler optimizations. |
| 1692 |
|
|
| 1693 |
|
On such environment, use of "dependency ordering" can lead to system |
| 1694 |
|
crash because the reader might read uninitialized value of newly |
| 1695 |
|
appended element. |
| 1696 |
|
|
| 1697 |
|
To prevent the reader from reading uninitialized value of newly appended |
| 1698 |
|
element, I inserted rcu_dereference() when walking the list. |
| 1699 |
|
|
| 1700 |
|
Fix 2008/11/04 |
| 1701 |
|
|
| 1702 |
|
@ Use sys_getpid() instead for current->pid. |
| 1703 |
|
|
| 1704 |
|
Kernel 2.6.24 introduced PID namespace. |
| 1705 |
|
|
| 1706 |
|
To compare PID given from userland, I can't use current->pid. |
| 1707 |
|
So, I modified to use sys_getpid() instead for current->pid. |
| 1708 |
|
|
| 1709 |
|
I modified to use task_tgid_nr_ns() for 2.6.25 and later instead for |
| 1710 |
|
current->tgid when checking /proc/self/ in get_absolute_path(). |
| 1711 |
|
|
| 1712 |
|
Fix 2008/11/07 |
| 1713 |
|
|
| 1714 |
|
@ Fix is_alphabet_char(). |
| 1715 |
|
|
| 1716 |
|
is_alphabet_char() should match 'A' - 'Z' and 'a' - 'z', |
| 1717 |
|
but was matching from 'A' - 'F' and 'a' - 'f'. |
| 1718 |
|
|
| 1719 |
|
@ Add /proc/ccs/.execute_handler . |
| 1720 |
|
|
| 1721 |
|
Process information became visible to userspace by |
| 1722 |
|
"Show process information in /proc/ccs/.process_status" feature. |
| 1723 |
|
However, programs specified by execute_handler directive may run as |
| 1724 |
|
non root user, making it impossible to see process information. |
| 1725 |
|
|
| 1726 |
|
So, I added a new interface that allows execute handler processes |
| 1727 |
|
to see process information. The content of /proc/ccs/.execute_handler is |
| 1728 |
|
identical to /proc/ccs/.process_status . |
| 1729 |
|
|
| 1730 |
|
Version 1.6.5 2008/11/11 Third anniversary release. |
| 1731 |
|
|
| 1732 |
|
Fix 2008/12/01 |
| 1733 |
|
|
| 1734 |
|
@ Introduce "task.type=execute_handler" condition. |
| 1735 |
|
|
| 1736 |
|
The execute_handler directive is very very powerful. You can use this |
| 1737 |
|
directive to do anything you want to do (e.g. logging and validating and |
| 1738 |
|
modifying command line parameters and environment variables, opening and |
| 1739 |
|
closing and redirecting files, creating pipes to implement antivirus and |
| 1740 |
|
spam filtering, deploying a DMZ between the ssh daemon and the login |
| 1741 |
|
shells). |
| 1742 |
|
|
| 1743 |
|
To be able to use this directive in a domain with keep_domain directive |
| 1744 |
|
while limiting access to resources needed for such purposes to only |
| 1745 |
|
programs invoked as an execute handler process, I added a new condition. |
| 1746 |
|
|
| 1747 |
|
In learning mode, "if task.type=execute_handler" condition part will be |
| 1748 |
|
automatically added for requests issued by an execute_handler process. |
| 1749 |
|
|
| 1750 |
|
@ Introduce file's type and permissions as conditions. |
| 1751 |
|
|
| 1752 |
|
To be able to limit file types a process can access, I added |
| 1753 |
|
new conditions for checking file's type and permissions. |
| 1754 |
|
For example, |
| 1755 |
|
|
| 1756 |
|
allow_read /etc/fstab if path1.type=file path1.perm=0644 |
| 1757 |
|
|
| 1758 |
|
will allow opening /etc/fstab for reading only if /etc/fstab is a regular |
| 1759 |
|
file and it's permission is 0644, and |
| 1760 |
|
|
| 1761 |
|
allow_write /dev/null if path1.type=char path1.dev_major=1 path1.dev_minor=3 |
| 1762 |
|
|
| 1763 |
|
will allow opening /dev/null for writing only if /dev/null is a character |
| 1764 |
|
device file with major=1 and minor=3 attributes. |
| 1765 |
|
|
| 1766 |
|
@ Add memory quota for temporary memory used for auditing. |
| 1767 |
|
|
| 1768 |
|
Although there are MAX_GRANT_LOG and MAX_REJECT_LOG parameters |
| 1769 |
|
which limit the number of entries for audit logs so that we can avoid |
| 1770 |
|
memory consumption by audit logs, it would be more convenient if we can |
| 1771 |
|
also limit the size in bytes. |
| 1772 |
|
Thus, I added a new quota line. |
| 1773 |
|
|
| 1774 |
|
echo Dynamic: 1048576 > /proc/ccs/meminfo |
| 1775 |
|
|
| 1776 |
|
This quota is not applied to temporary memory used for permission checks. |
| 1777 |
|
|
| 1778 |
|
Fix 2008/12/09 |
| 1779 |
|
|
| 1780 |
|
@ Fix ccs_can_save_audit_log() checks. |
| 1781 |
|
|
| 1782 |
|
Due to incorrect statement "if (ccs_can_save_audit_log() < 0)" |
| 1783 |
|
while ccs_can_save_audit_log() is boolean, MAX_GRANT_LOG and |
| 1784 |
|
MAX_REJECT_LOG were not working. |
| 1785 |
|
|
| 1786 |
|
This bug will trigger OOM killer if /usr/sbin/ccs-auditd is not working. |
| 1787 |
|
|
| 1788 |
|
Fix 2008/12/24 |
| 1789 |
|
|
| 1790 |
|
@ Add "ccs_" prefix. |
| 1791 |
|
|
| 1792 |
|
To be able to tell whether a symbol is TOMOYO Linux related or not, |
| 1793 |
|
I added "ccs_" prefix as much as possible. |
| 1794 |
|
|
| 1795 |
|
@ Fix ccs_check_flags() error message. |
| 1796 |
|
|
| 1797 |
|
I meant to print SYAORAN-ERROR: message when error == -EPERM, |
| 1798 |
|
but I was printing it when error == 0 since 1.6.0 . |
| 1799 |
|
|
| 1800 |
|
Fix 2009/01/05 |
| 1801 |
|
|
| 1802 |
|
@ Use kmap_atomic()/kunmap_atomic() for reading "struct linux_binprm". |
| 1803 |
|
|
| 1804 |
|
As remove_arg_zero() uses kmap_atomic(KM_USER0), I modified to use |
| 1805 |
|
kmap_atomic(KM_USER0) rather than kmap(). |
| 1806 |
|
|
| 1807 |
|
Fix 2009/01/28 |
| 1808 |
|
|
| 1809 |
|
@ Fix "allow_read" + "allow_write" != "allow_read/write" problem. |
| 1810 |
|
|
| 1811 |
|
Since 1.6.0 , due to a bug in ccs_update_single_path_acl(), |
| 1812 |
|
appending "allow_read/write" entry didn't update internal "allow_read" |
| 1813 |
|
and "allow_write" entries. As a result, attempt to open(O_RDWR) succeeds |
| 1814 |
|
but open(O_RDONLY) and open(O_WRONLY) fail. |
| 1815 |
|
|
| 1816 |
|
Workaround is to write an entry twice when newly appending that entry. |
| 1817 |
|
If written twice, internal "allow_read" and "allow_write" entries |
| 1818 |
|
are updated. |
| 1819 |
|
|
| 1820 |
|
Fix 2009/02/26 |
| 1821 |
|
|
| 1822 |
|
@ Fix profile read error. |
| 1823 |
|
|
| 1824 |
|
Incorrect profiles were shown in /proc/ccs/profile |
| 1825 |
|
if either CONFIG_SAKURA or CONFIG_TOMOYO is disabled. |
| 1826 |
|
|
| 1827 |
|
Fix 2009/03/02 |
| 1828 |
|
|
| 1829 |
|
@ Undelete CONFIG_TOMOYO_AUDIT option. |
| 1830 |
|
|
| 1831 |
|
While HDD-less systems can use profiles with MAX_GRANT_LOG=0 and |
| 1832 |
|
MAX_REJECT_LOG=0 , I undeleted CONFIG_TOMOYO_AUDIT option for saving |
| 1833 |
|
memory used for /proc/ccs/grant_log and /proc/ccs/reject_log interfaces. |
| 1834 |
|
|
| 1835 |
|
Fix 2009/03/13 |
| 1836 |
|
|
| 1837 |
|
@ Show only profile entry names ever specified. |
| 1838 |
|
|
| 1839 |
|
Even if an administrator specifies only COMMENT= and MAC_FOR_FILE= |
| 1840 |
|
entries for /proc/ccs/profile , all available profile entries are shown. |
| 1841 |
|
This was designed to help administrators to know what entries are |
| 1842 |
|
available, but sometimes makes administrators feel noisy because of |
| 1843 |
|
entries showing default values. |
| 1844 |
|
|
| 1845 |
|
Thus, I modified to show only profile entry names ever specified. |
| 1846 |
|
|
| 1847 |
|
Fix 2009/03/18 |
| 1848 |
|
|
| 1849 |
|
@ Add MAC_FOR_IOCTL functionality. |
| 1850 |
|
|
| 1851 |
|
To be able to restrict ioctl() requests, I added MAC_FOR_IOCTL |
| 1852 |
|
functionality. |
| 1853 |
|
|
| 1854 |
|
This functionality requires modification of ccs-patch-\*.diff . |
| 1855 |
|
|
| 1856 |
|
@ Use better name for socket's pathname. |
| 1857 |
|
|
| 1858 |
|
Until now, socket's pathname was represented as "socket:[\$]" format |
| 1859 |
|
where \$ is inode's number. But inode's number is useless for name based |
| 1860 |
|
access control. Therefore, I modified to represent socket's pathname as |
| 1861 |
|
"socket:[family=\$:type=\$:protocol=\$]" format. |
| 1862 |
|
|
| 1863 |
|
This will help administrator to control ioctl() against sockets more |
| 1864 |
|
precisely. |
| 1865 |
|
|
| 1866 |
|
@ Fix misplaced ccs_capable() call. (only 2.6.8-\* and 2.6.9-\*) |
| 1867 |
|
|
| 1868 |
|
Location to insert ccs_capable(TOMOYO_SYS_IOCTL) in sys_ioctl() was |
| 1869 |
|
wrong since version 1.1 . |
| 1870 |
|
|
| 1871 |
|
@ Insert ccs_check_ioctl_permission() call. |
| 1872 |
|
|
| 1873 |
|
To make MAC_FOR_IOCTL functionality working, I inserted |
| 1874 |
|
ccs_check_ioctl_permission() call into ccs-patch-\*.diff . |
| 1875 |
|
|
| 1876 |
|
Fix 2009/03/23 |
| 1877 |
|
|
| 1878 |
|
@ Move sysctl()'s check from ccs-patch-\*.diff to fs/tomoyo_file.c . |
| 1879 |
|
|
| 1880 |
|
Since try_parse_table() in kernel/sysctl.c is almost identical between |
| 1881 |
|
all versions, I moved that function to fs/tomoyo_file.c . |
| 1882 |
|
|
| 1883 |
|
@ Relocate definitions and functions. |
| 1884 |
|
|
| 1885 |
|
To reduce exposed symbols, I relocated some definitions and functions. |
| 1886 |
|
|
| 1887 |
|
Fix 2009/03/24 |
| 1888 |
|
|
| 1889 |
|
@ Add CONFIG_TOMOYO_BUILTIN_INITIALIZERS option. |
| 1890 |
|
|
| 1891 |
|
Some systems don't have /sbin/modprobe and /sbin/hotplug . |
| 1892 |
|
Thus, I made these pathnames configurable. |
| 1893 |
|
|
| 1894 |
|
Version 1.6.7 2009/04/01 Feature enhancement release. |
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